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ABSTRACT 
The greater Los Angeles urban area is home to nearly 19 million people, but has local water 
resources that can only support a population of approximately one million. Los Angeles has 
always depended upon a large proportion of imported water, but severe droughts within the last 
three years have resulted in water shortages that have critical implications for the future of the 
city. In addition to these water supply issues, this thesis examines larger questions of scarcity, 
inequity and social justice that manifest themselves in the urban fabric of Los Angeles, a city that 
has the least amount of parks and public spaces of any major city in North America and has 
been rife with inequality, racism, poverty and crime.  
The term ‘metabolic rift’, refers to the division between humanity and nature, and the 
resultant ecological crises wrought by industrial capitalism1. This concept can be expanded to 
include all manner of socio-ecological crises produced by processes of neoliberal global 
capitalism. The metabolic rift is a space of exclusion and subjugation, degradation and precarity, 
scarcity and toxicity—an expanding territory of perpetual crisis. In examining the evolution of 
the urban development of Los Angeles in the context of the production of metabolic rifts and 
increasingly critical water scarcity, this thesis correlates the production of a capital-driven urban 
fabric and the expanding network of hydrological infrastructures. In this, issues of sustainability, 
environmental and social justice, as well as critiques of late capitalism and nature-culture 
discourses are interrogated.  
To address issues of water scarcity, this thesis proposes a strategy of tapping into the storm 
water sewer network of Los Angeles, channelling this water, regarded as a waste product and a 
hazard, and transforming it into a resource. This water will be reclaimed through a network of 
constructed wetlands that perform a hybrid function as storm water management and water 
treatment infrastructure, as well as parks and public spaces. This design proposal also includes a 
mixed use development in Compton that incorporates housing, community programs and a 
constructed wetlands park. The ambition is propose a model that can be a robust and sustainable 
approach to water conservation and management, as well as a space of inclusion—a productive 
commons outside the territory of capitalism. 
1 John Bellamy Foster, “Marx’s Theory of Metabolic Rift: Classical Foundations for Environmental Sociology,” The 
American Journal of Sociology 105 (2) (1999): 381. doi: 10.1086/210315. 
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INTRODUCTION 
If there is a term that comprehensively characterizes the 21st century, it would be crisis. The most 
highly discussed among these is anthropogenic climate change and the multitude of negative 
impacts it has generated. There has also been an emerging awareness of a constellation of crises 
related to water, in terms of both scarcity and excess. There is extended drought, desertification, 
and rapid groundwater depletion in a growing number of regions around the globe, as well as a 
lack of clean drinking water for more than one billion people. Rising sea levels and increasingly 
extreme weather events have contributed to a dramatic rise in devastating flood events across 
the world. There have also been a series of global economic crises, as well as unprecedented 
levels of economic inequality in both developed and developing countries. 
When considered separately, these issues, as well as a host of others, can be overwhelming in 
their complexity, and the prospect of adequately addressing them appears dim. However, if they 
are not considered in isolation, and could be analyzed as symptoms of a more central structural 
crisis, this could provide a comprehensive and robust framework to begin to address them. This 
thesis investigates the possibility that this central crisis has arisen from the structural 
contradictions at the core of neoliberal global capitalism and the techno-scientific apparatuses 
that have enabled its explosive expansion and the unprecedented levels of the production of 
nature it has achieved. 
This thesis explores these crises in the context of the historical development of Los Angeles 
and the contemporary issues it is facing. LA’s relationship with water has been defined by 
phenomena stemming from both scarcity and excess. Socio-economic inequity has left an 
indelible impact on the fabric of the city and continues to be a critical issue. Los Angeles is a 
major global city—a first-tier node in world-wide capital networks, and thus, expresses many of 
the symptoms of stark income inequality and increasingly critical levels of unaffordability in 
housing markets experienced in cities like New York and London. 
Chapter 1 of this thesis investigates the history of the development of Los Angeles through 
the lens of its relationship to water, which has been, and continues to be, a defining element of 
the city. Los Angeles has a limited supply of local water resources, and has needed to continually 
increase this supply throughout the 20th century as population growth surged, and the city and 
surrounding area expanded to what is now a vast metropolitan area of over 87,000 km2 with 
xv 
nearly 19 million people2. This has been largely achieved through the acquisition of resources 
from progressively distant sources—the Owens River, the Sacramento-San Joaquin delta, and 
the Colorado River.  
A counterpoint to this expansion of imported water supplies, as a genealogy of scarcity, is 
sporadic surges of excess—a history of devastating floods and ongoing efforts to contain their 
damage. The most iconic and definitive of these mitigation efforts was the work of the US Army 
Corps of Engineers to transform the Los Angeles River and many of its tributaries into a vast 
network of concrete-lined channels designed to transport stormwater, as quickly and efficiently 
as possible, away from highly developed urban areas and into the ocean. 
Recently, a multi-year drought has strained California’s already limited water resources, 
prompting a state-wide mandate of a 25% reduction in water use. Increased demand from 
projected population growth and uncertainty of supply due to climate change suggest that this 
scarcity will be the ‘new normal’ and that innovative conservation strategies will be needed to 
ensure that diminishing water supplies can meet the growing needs of a populous and 
economically productive state. 
Chapter 2 investigates the dynamics of capitalism and its relationship to human and non-
human actors in the biosphere through the theoretical framework of the ‘metabolic rift’3, a term 
coined by John Bellamy-Foster to advance the analysis of the environmental and social 
degradation wrought by 19th century industrial capitalism as detailed by Karl Marx. In locating 
the processes of capitalism in both environmental and human spheres, this theoretical construct 
provides an analytical framework to investigate a myriad of crises. 
‘Uneven development’ is another theoretical construct employed in this thesis to examine 
both environmental and socio-economic issues. Where the concept of the metabolic rift 
examines the meta-level crises of capitalism, the theory of uneven development investigates how 
these are manifested spatially. Chapter 3 details this theory and illustrates its manifestation, in a 
variety of examples, in the built fabric of Los Angeles. While there are universal tendencies of 
neoliberal global capitalism, its forces can have highly localized expressions, privileging some 
people while marginalizing others—enhancing some environments while degrading others. 
Chapter 4 introduces a theoretical construct, ‘the right to the city’, that posits a response to 
structural inequities of capitalism through the advancement of the notion that participation and 
2 City Population, “Los Angeles-Long Beach Combined Statistical Area,” Accessed March 14, 2015, 
http://www.citypopulation.de/php/usa-combmetro.php?cid=348. 
3 John Bellamy Foster, ibid., 301. 
xvi 
agency in the urban sphere is a basic human right. This challenges the exclusive nature of private 
property rights, a fundamental construct of capitalism. The second part of this chapter, 
Excavating the Commons, outlines an alternative model of property rights, ‘the Commons’, as 
a third pillar of governance alongside capitalism and representative democracy. Its potential for 
community-based property ownership, political agency, and economic self-sufficiency will be 
investigated. 
Chapter 5, Compton Commons, extends the investigation into commons-based resource 
and property management and posits a strategic platform for integrating these concepts into the 
design of a mixed-use development that provides a foundation for community-building based on 
inclusivity, resource stewardship, affordability and grassroots economic development. This 
approach is meant to foster a transition from a ‘government’ paradigm to a ‘governance’ model. 
A top-down approach will be supplanted by a bottom-up approach to resource management. In 
this model, water resources will be managed by the community at the sub-watershed level in a 
transparent and inclusive manner that brings together expert knowledge, community 
consultation and stakeholder involvement in a results-oriented governance process that is based 
on accountability, flexibility, and transparency. Property and economic development, community 
services, arts, culture and leisure will be managed in a similar manner—through community 
involvement and consensus building—not provided from above as a government service or 
capitalist commodity. 
The culmination of this thesis is the design of a masterplan for Compton Commons, a 
locally-scaled response to the issues that have been investigated. It is not intended to be a 
comprehensive solution to the issues investigated, but a contribution to a larger contemporary 
discourse involving of a multitude of proposals, critiques, projections, and future imaginaries. 
This design proposal is positioned between the practical and the speculative; it has objectives 
that are ambitious yet achievable, combined with goals that slightly push the boundaries of what 
is considered possible today. 

1 1.0     L O S  A N G E L E S  |  W A T E R
1.1 Ordinary Extremes
Los Angeles has always had a complex relationship with water, a love-hate aff air marked 
by dependence and fear, scarcity and excess. Th e image of an idyllic paradise of perpetual 
sunshine spurred the city’s early years of explosive growth, attracting a multitude of 
Easterners who sought out the benign environment of warm air and fair skies—a climate 
that reputedly had the power to cure a wide variety of ailments.4 Here at western end of 
the continent was an earthly Eden, where it was neither too cold nor too hot and where 
the air was softened by moisture from the ocean but it hardly ever rained. Th is image of 
paradise that Los Angeles’ boosters have aggressively promoted has driven dramatic levels 
of urban growth, but the limited amount of local water resources has also historically 
been the most signifi cant factor constraining the city’s otherwise unfettered development. 
However, Los Angeles is not only about sunshine and water scarcity, it also epitomizes 
the old adage that when it rains, it pours. Or expressed more dramatically, “it neither 
rains nor pours; the skies simply open up and dump oceans of water on the land.”5
LA’s mediterranean climate is characterized by long periods of drought 
punctuated by infrequent and extreme precipitation events. 92 percent of the annual 
precipitation in Los Angeles falls between November and May. Rainfall is unevenly 
distributed within each year, also exhibiting greater year-to-year fl uctuations than 
is typical for cities in temperate climates. To a meteorologist, “when viewed serially, 
historic seasonal rainfall totals in the Los Angeles area display an almost aggravating 
randomness.”6 In these conditions, meteorological averages lose their value as predictors 
of typical conditions and “average is only a transitional state between extremes 
of wet and dry, fl ood and drought.”7 In LA’s climate, extremes are commonplace.
Urban theorist Mike Davis outlines an instructive comparison of how diff erent 
groups of settlers arriving in Southern California perceived this climate. Th e fi rst 
wave of non-native arrivals, “the Franciscans and their Spanish military escorts…were 
intimately familiar with the dramatic landscape metabolism of the Mediterranean 
region.” In contrast, the large number of Easterners and Midwesterners who began 
4 Carey McWilliams, Southern California Country: An Island on the Land (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1946), 96–103.
5 Ibid., 184.
6 “Th e Climate of Los Angeles, California,” National Weather Service – Los Angeles/Oxnard Weather Forecast Offi  ce, accessed 
February 3, 2015, http://www.wrh.noaa.gov/lox/archive/LAClimate_text.pdf, 26.
7 Ibid., 26–27.
2Fig. 1.01 Average annual precipitation of 5 major U.S. cities
Los Angeles
Inches
14.9
10
20
30
40
50
60
San Francisco
21.2
Chicago
35.3
New York
44.9
58.5
Miami
Los Angeles
Average Annual Precipitation
settling in Los Angeles roughly a century after the Spaniards’ arrival literally lacked 
the words to describe this kind of environment. “English terminology, specifi c to 
a humid climate, proved incapable of accurately capturing the dialectic of water 
and drought,” Davis asserts.8 In one illustrative example, chaparral, the word for 
the thick, tangled, and highly combustible shrubs that cover the hillsides of coastal 
Southern California, is believed to have originated from the Basque language.9
Mediterranean climates diff er from the temperate climates of the Eastern U.S. and 
northern Europe in several important ways. In temperate climes, low-intensity, high-
frequency events are the principal climatic driver, but in California’s mediterranean 
climate, the opposite is true. In contrast to the gradual onset of fairly consistent 
precipitation events, change in climatic conditions comes in sudden bursts—the result 
of high-intensity, low-frequency events10 (see Figures 1.01, 1.02, 1.03 and 1.04). Mediterranean 
environments are also characterized by a much greater degree of complexity than 
is typical of temperate environments. Th is is due in part to the topography of 
Southern California; the mountains ranges surrounding Los Angeles create numerous 
microclimates within a small area. Each microclimate constitutes a unique ecological 
niche, resulting in greater biodiversity-more complexity per square mile. Th is greater 
complexity also introduces a signifi cant degree of uncertainty, displaying characteristics 
of a chaotic system in which “small changes in driving variables or inputs – magnifi ed by 
feedback – can produce disproportionate, even discontinuous, outcomes.”11 An example 
8 Mike Davis, Ecology of Fear: Los Angeles and the Imagination of Disaster (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1998), 11–13.
9 Merriam-Webster Online, s.v. “chaparral,” accessed April 30, 2015, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/chaparral.
10 Davis, Ecology of Fear, 17–18.
11 Ibid., 19.
3Fig. 1.02 Streamfl ow—Los Angeles and Charles Rivers
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4Fig. 1.03 Los Angeles-Annual precipitation-departure from mean (1879-1998)
Fig. 1.04 Boston-Annual precipitation—departure from mean (1879-1998)
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5of such a feedback loop, one which has caused major destruction in greater Los Angeles 
over the years, is the cycle of fi re-fl ooding-erosion. Multiple-year droughts create ideal 
conditions for wildfi re; these fi res sweep rapidly through the hills, leaving their slopes 
barren. When the drought is broken by a heavy rain event, there is nothing to hold the 
hillsides in place, and massive fl ows of mud and boulders surge down into the valleys. 
In these situations, fi re and fl ooding amplify each other’s eff ects. Th e current drought 
in California exemplifi es this process; extreme drought over several years (2012-2015) 
was accompanied by heavy—but brief rainfall in the spring of 2015, which caused 
localized fl ooding and extensive landslides, followed by wildfi res in September 2015.
Th e chaos and complexity that defi ne the climate and landscape of Southern 
California share similarities to the dynamic systems of rivers.  Geologist Jeff rey F. Mount 
describes a cycle known as ‘dynamic metastable equilibrium’, in which dramatic shifts in 
a river’s morphology occur that can be related to long-term changes in climate, tectonics/
geology, and “the cumulative impacts of certain land use practices.”12 While the existence 
of some kind of relationship between these elements is well established, what is less 
understood is the way that incremental changes in these external variables eventually 
precipitate short-term bursts of change in rivers. In search of a scientifi c explanation for 
such cataclysmic episodes, geologists have proposed theories about thresholds that, once 
crossed, trigger massive change.13 Knowledge of these forces is incomplete and predictive 
models are problematic and nearly impossible to establish. Th ese systems are not random 
in the strictest sense, but the logic of their operation is so complex that they usually defy 
human attempts to forecast their outcomes. Tinkering with such complex systems is, from 
Mount’s perspective, a risky and ill-advised endeavour. Th is point of view, he believes, is
signifi cantly diff erent from that held by most hydrologists and engineers, who see 
a river as a…hazard whose seemingly capricious behavior needs to be controlled 
by bigger and better engineering solutions. Problems created by altering the 
variables will be corrected by yet more engineering solutions. Th e geologist 
sees these solutions as ultimately ‘temporary’ and doomed to eventual failure.14
1.2 Water Supply
1.2.1 Th e Los Angeles River
Th e paradoxical nature of LA’s natural context is exemplifi ed in what was once a defi ning 
12 Jeff rey F. Mount, California Rivers and Streams: Th e Confl ict Between Fluvial Process and Land Use (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1995), 11.
13 Ibid., 12.
14 Ibid., xiii.
6natural feature: the Los Angeles River. LA’s downtown is located fi fteen miles inland from 
the Pacifi c Ocean, on a site devoid of any remarkable features, near the part of the river 
known as the Glendale Narrows—the only reliable, year-round source of fresh water 
in the entire LA Basin.15 For the Native Americans who had established their villages 
along its banks for thousands of years, for the Spanish missionaries who encountered 
them in the late 18th century, and for the residents of the young city that grew up 
around the pueblo, the LA River was a source of life. Early accounts described a lush 
riparian landscape teeming with wildlife, a stark contrast to the industrialized corridors 
fl anking the concrete-lined channels of the contemporary LA River. In the time before 
the urbanization of Los Angeles there were oak, walnut, willow and cottonwood trees 
among the bulrushes, reeds and cattails (see Figures 1.05 and 1.06).  Th e riparian corridors 
of the river provided habitat for deer, antelope, coyotes, gray foxes, mountain lions, 
and the occasional grizzly bear. Th e ecosystem of the river and its tributaries supported 
at least seven species of fi sh and more than 100 bird species such as nighthawks, 
cactus wren, roadrunners, long-eared owls, California quail, and green-backed herons, 
to name a few.16 Prior to the arrival of Europeans, the Tongva (Gabrielino) peoples 
native to the Los Angeles region lived a hunter-gatherer lifestyle from the bounties 
of the river. Th e Tongva derived the raw materials for all of their food, clothing, and 
shelter from the plant and animal life sustained by the river’s ecosystem.17 When the 
Spanish arrived in the region, there were some twenty-six villages within one mile of 
the river.18 One of the largest of these villages, called Yangna, is believed to have been 
located near the present-day location of Union Station in downtown Los Angeles.19
On September 4, 1781, a group of eleven families recruited by Spanish authorities 
established El Pueblo de Nuestra Señora la Reina de los Ángeles de Porciúncula.20 Th ey 
tapped the river’s fl ow to supply their needs, beginning with the construction of the 
Zanja Madre (mother ditch), which ran south from the river to the plaza, the hub of 
the new settlement. In the years to follow, the zanja system was expanded to allow more 
lands beyond the pueblo to be settled and cultivated. By the 1880s, the system had 
expanded enough in scale and complexity to require the employment of a zanjero and 
15 Blake Gumprecht, Th e Los Angeles River: Its Life, Death, and Possible Rebirth (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 
4, 26–30.
16 Ibid., 22–26.
17 Ibid., 31–32.
18 Ibid., 29.
19 Ibid., 29.
20 Ibid., 43.
7several assistants.21 Water from the river, distributed through the zanja network, enabled 
the transformation of the semi-arid LA basin into a cultivated landscape of vineyards and 
orchards. Th e riparian environment described in earlier accounts was gradually replaced 
by thousands of acres of oranges and lemons, olives and grapes.22 Th e abundant harvest 
from these fi elds, with embellishment from city boosters, contributed to LA’s turn-of-the-
century image as a garden paradise. Th is image, disseminated through a variety of media, 
from fruit crate labels to World’s Fair exhibits, played a signifi cant role in attracting 
new settlers to Southern California, fostering the region’s fi rst major population boom.
1.2.2 Th e Need for Imported Water
Los Angeles was a sparsely populated agricultural settlement until late in the 
19th century, even as San Francisco’s population exploded during the Gold Rush 
era. LA was yet to be connected to the rest of the nation, isolated by mountains 
on three sides and by an ocean on the fourth (the port at San Pedro Bay, now the 
nation’s busiest, was then in its infancy). In 1876, however, the fi rst transcontinental 
railroad arrived, virtually assuring that Los Angeles’s future would be urban.
By the beginning of the 20th century, the region’s population had grown substantially. 
Th is wave of growth was unique in that most of people who came to LA at this time 
were searching not for a living, but for the ‘good life’. Th is contrasts with the desperate 
motivations of those who would come to LA in subsequent migrations (Dust Bowl 
refugees during the Depression, African Americans during World War II, and an array 
of Latino and Asian groups more recently). Th ose arriving in Los Angeles at the turn 
of the century were, as characterized by Mike Davis, “the restless but affl  uent babbitry 
of the Middle West…retired farmers, small-town dentists, wealthy spinsters, tubercular 
schoolteachers, petty stock speculators, Iowa lawyers, and devotees of the Chautauqua 
circuit.”23 It was irrelevant that Los Angeles had yet to develop a burgeoning economic 
base. Th e Southern California landscape appealed to their desire for idyllic landscapes, 
mild climate and a greater contact with the ‘exotic’. In Los Angeles: Th e Architecture of 
Four Ecologies (1971), Reyner Banham argued that “it was this promise of an ecological 
miracle that was the area’s fi rst really saleable product – the ‘land of perpetual spring’.”24
Los Angeles’s population was more than doubling every ten years (see Figure 1.07). It 
21 Ibid., 77.
22 Ibid., 55.
23 Mike Davis, City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles (London: Verso, 1990), 25.
24 Reyner Banham, Los Angeles: Th e Architecture of Four Ecologies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 13.
8Fig. 1.05 Los Angeles River (ca. 1900)
Fig. 1.06 Farmland and the Los Angeles River looking north from Elysian Park (ca. 1895)
9soon became clear that the river would not be able to supply all the city’s water needs 
for much longer. It was estimated that the river could dependably supply 45 to 50 
million gallons per day (MGD). Per capita water use was slightly over 300 gallons per 
day (far higher than in most cities), so the river could only sustain a population of about 
150,000.25 Th e discovery of artesian waters beneath the LA Basin seemed to off er a 
solution to the problem. Th ese waters, like the debris cones and alluvial plain underlying 
the city, had accumulated over millions of years. When the fi rst wells were drilled in the 
1870s, the subterranean water would sometimes shoot up dozens of feet in the air. Th ere 
was a widespread belief at the time that the supply of these waters was limitless, but by 
the turn of the century the water table had already declined substantially in many places. 
Water that had gushed forth in 1875 could scarcely be made to appear in 1900, even 
with concerted pumping.26 As Carey McWilliams observed, “the artesian water supply 
was wasted, as a young spendthrift might dissipate a legacy, in a single generation.”27
From 1893 to 1904, a drought loomed over the region. William Mulholland, then 
the city’s chief zanjero, became increasingly alarmed about the city’s dwindling water 
supplies, and took the step of installing water meters for the fi rst time. In 1903, he went 
so far as to propose that the city’s further growth be capped.28  He also advocated an 
ecologically sensitive approach that focused on maximizing the capture of rainwater to 
replenish local aquifers through soil and forest conservation.29 Th is approach was never 
implemented as Los Angeles’ growth quickly outpaced the capacity of local resources.
1.2.3 Th e Owens Valley and the Rise of Los Angeles
Th e closest major water reserves lay over two hundred miles to the northeast, in the 
Owens Valley, sourced by large quantities of mountain snowmelt. Th e Owens Valley 
runs about seventy-fi ve miles long and stretches between the eleven-thousand-foot 
Inyo Mountains to the east and the fourteen-thousand-foot Sierra Nevada range to the 
west. At the southern end of the valley is Owens Lake, a broad and shallow water body 
fed by the Owens River. At the turn of the 20th century, the Bureau of Reclamation, 
the federal agency responsible for water management in the Western U.S.A., was 
planning to build an irrigation system there to aid Owens Valley farmers. Mulholland, 
backed by a syndicate of powerful investors that included Harrison Gray Otis, the 
25 Gumprecht, Los Angeles River, 96.
26 Marc Reisner, Cadillac Desert: the American West and its disappearing water (New York: Viking, 1986), 62.
27 McWilliams, Island on the Land, 185.
28 Gumprecht, Los Angeles River, 99.
29 Reisner, Cadillac Desert, 61.
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Fig. 1.08 Los Angeles Aqueduct opening ceremony (November 5, 1913)
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publisher of the Los Angeles Times, and his son-in-law and successor, Harry Chandler, 
had a hidden agenda—to build a massive aqueduct to supply water to Los Angeles.
Eaton, whose family had founded the city of Pasadena, northeast of Los Angeles, 
wielded his infl uence in state political circles and then met with President Th eodore 
Roosevelt’s advisers in Washington, DC, in an attempt to quash the Bureau of 
Reclamation’s irrigation plan. At the same time, he quietly and systematically bought 
up water rights and large parcels of land in Owens Valley to sell them to Los Angeles 
to facilitate their water procurement plans and secure a considerable personal profi t. 
When the city’s clandestine aqueduct plan was fi nally discovered and revealed in 1905, 
the farmers, ranchers, and miners in Owens Valley rose up in protest. Th is resistance, 
however, came too late. Eaton and his friends had seized control of the valley’s water rights 
through a series of strategically placed legitimate land purchases bolstered by bribes and 
intimidation. While the valley’s residents were alarmed and outraged by the city’s takeover, 
Eaton, Chandler, and Otis persuaded the citizens of Los Angeles that an aqueduct was 
crucial to ensuring the survival of the city. Th ey waged a campaign of infl uence through 
disinformation, using Otis’ and Chandler’s powerful platform—the Los Angeles Times. 
Th ey ran a series of articles and editorials that gave the impression the city was facing 
drought. Th e City of Los Angeles instituted strict restrictions forbidding people from 
watering their lawns, all the while lowering the city’s water supply by dumping it into 
sewers. Eaton’s group, however, withheld their strategy that Owens Valley water would 
not only serve the city but would also be used to irrigate the San Fernando Valley, a semi-
desert region just north of Los Angeles that was not legally part of the city (yet). Otis, 
Chandler, and others bought up large parcels in the valley and pushed for the bond that 
would fund the construction of the aqueduct. Bringing water to the San Fernando Valley, 
in addition to Los Angeles, would net them vast profi ts on their land acquisitions there, 
enabling large-scale development. In the summer of 1906, President Roosevelt allowed 
the aqueduct to cross federal lands. Th e following year, motivated by fears that they 
were running out of water, the citizens of Los Angeles voted to approve $22.5 million in 
bonds to build a 233-mile-long aqueduct to bring water from Owens Valley to the city.
Th is was the historical premise of Roman Polanski’s classic fi lm noir, “Chinatown”, 
which starred Jack Nicholson as a private investigator who becomes embroiled 
in machinations over Los Angeles’s theft of water from a rural valley. In the 
fi lm’s reframing of historical events, power brokers manipulate a public good—
the water supply—to amass large personal fortunes in what was ostensibly a real 
12
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Fig. 1.09 Map of Los Angeles water supply sources
estate speculation scam. Th e fi lm, and the events that inspired it, became a potent 
founding myth of the city of Los Angeles. It is the apogee of the American ‘Wild 
West’ ethos—rapid, infrastructurally-driven development in a context of greed, 
corruption, lawlessness and violence. While the railroad was the driver of the expansion 
of the West in the 19th century, the aqueduct was its 20th century counterpart.
William Mulholland supervised the construction of the Los Angeles Aqueduct, which 
became the world’s longest at the time. Starting in 1908, the project took fi ve years, 
requiring over two thousand workers and the drilling of 164 tunnels to drain water from 
Owens Valley to the San Fernando Valley and the city. In a defi ning moment for both Los 
Angeles and future development in the American West, the Los Angeles Aqueduct was 
completed on November 5, 1913. It carried water 233 miles from the Owens Valley in the 
eastern Sierra, across the Mojave Desert and into the San Fernando reservoir, north of Los 
Angeles. At the aqueduct’s opening ceremony, as water coursed down the cascades for the 
fi rst time, Mulholland made his famous proclamation to Angelenos: “Th ere it is. Take it.” (see 
Figure 1.08). An editorial in the Los Angeles Times the following day glorifi ed the occasion:
…And a great river has been turned from its course – a course that it followed 
since the hand of God raised the mountains and laid the oceans in their places 
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on the morn of creation – and brought down to serve the people of Los Angeles 
who are here today, and the millions more who are to come tomorrow, and 
tomorrow, and tomorrow.30
In 1915, Los Angeles annexed the mostly rural San Fernando Valley, more than 
doubling the size of the city. Th e arid San Fernando region was transformed into a major 
agricultural center of corn, cotton, citrus, and walnut growing. Th ese agrarian origins, 
like most of Southern California, progressively gave way to massive urbanization. By 
1960, the valley had over a million inhabitants; by 2007, the valley’s population had 
reached 1.7 million. Without new sources of water, there is no development. Mulholland 
summed this up in another oft-quoted phrase, ‘If we can’t get it, we won’t need it.’
Los Angeles’s growth became self-perpetuating: the availability of water created 
demand for more housing and jobs, which naturally created demand for more water. 
Th is symbiotic cycle of development and escalating water procurement became a 
defi ning feature of Los Angeles’ growth. What happened in the following years typifi es a 
pattern that has recurred with several variations in the history of Los Angeles, in which 
a perception of unlimited, eternal abundance gives way to the reality of inadequacy.
1.2.4 Beyond the Los Angeles Aqueduct
In 1923, only ten years after the opening of the Los Angeles Aqueduct, Mulholland had 
cast his eye to a watershed yet more distant than the Owens Valley, and recommended 
that the city begin assessing the feasibility of importing water from the Colorado River.31 
Th at vision became a reality in 1941, when the 242-mile-long Colorado River Aqueduct 
came online. With the addition of this second aqueduct, Los Angeles’ water was now 
imported from a watershed that spanned from Wyoming to New Mexico. Unlike the Los 
Angeles Aqueduct, which the city’s Department of Water and Power (LADWP) had built 
on its own, the Colorado River Aqueduct was constructed in cooperation with the federal 
government (the Hoover Dam, integrated with this project, remains one of the greatest 
monuments ever to federally-sponsored public works). What the two aqueducts did have 
in common was the prolonged legal wrangling that accompanied and outlasted the massive 
physical construction. Th e city had battled the Owens Valley over water rights, but now 
the new adversary was the state of Arizona. Th e arguments reached a peak when a case 
brought by Arizona reached the Supreme Court in 1956, resulting in “one of history’s most 
30 Quoted in Richard Gordon Lillard, Eden in Jeopardy; Man’s Prodigal Meddling with His Environment: the Southern California 
Experience (New York: Knopf, 1966), 142.
31 Ibid., 143.
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Fig. 1.10 Section of Los Angeles Aqueduct
Fig. 1.11 Los Angeles Aqueduct at Jawbone Canyon
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complicated water cases,” a trial that produced more than 22,000 pages of testimony and 
4,000 exhibits, and was ultimately decided in Arizona’s favor.32 As with the fi rst aqueduct, 
these legal battles have continued to this day, with ongoing repercussions for Los Angeles.
By the early 1960s, the region’s population had multiplied yet again, and the cycle of 
searching for another water source began again. Th e California Aqueduct, completed in 
phases over the next ten years, would be the largest and longest yet, spanning 444 miles 
from the Feather River in northern California to the metropolises of the south. California’s 
governor at the time, Pat Brown, promised that the project would “correct an accident of 
people and geography” by connecting the water-rich north with the water-hungry south33 
(see Figure 1.09). Before this water could reach Los Angeles, however, it had to surmount the 
Tehachapi Mountains. Th is herculean feat is accomplished by the Edmonston pumping 
plant. Every minute, the pumps at the Edmonston plant can lift 2 million gallons of 
water 1,926 feet over the mountains, after which it fl ows downhill to the cities below34 
(see Figures 1.10 and 1.11). To do so, this single pumping plant uses, on average, 3,280 GWh 
(gigawatt hours) of electric power per year, enough to supply a city of 1.4 million people.35
1.3. Flooding
1.3.1 Geographical Context
Los Angeles is not unique among major cities, in that it is subject to occasional bouts 
of heavy rain. However, in the case of LA, the eff ects of these precipitation events are 
exacerbated by the region’s topography. Less than fi fteen miles from downtown, the broad, 
fl at expanse of the basin terminates at the foothills of the San Gabriel Mountains. Th eir 
ascent is steep, gaining elevation at the rate of 2,000 feet per horizontal mile, reaching a 
peak of over 10,000 feet. In the winter, storm systems that have carried moisture thousands 
of miles across the Pacifi c meet these mountains and, unable to travel any further, deposit 
their moisture onto the slopes below. Here, some of the most intense rainfall in the United 
States has been recorded, such as on a single day in January 1943 when over 26 inches of 
32 Ibid., 145.
33 Joel Bourne, “California’s Pipe Dream,” National Geographic, April 2010, http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/print/2010/04/
plumbing–california/bourne–text.
34 “California State Water Project at a Glance,” California Department of Water Resources, accessed March 9, 2015, http://www.
water.ca.gov/recreation/brochures/pdf/swp_glance.pdf. (capacity = 4,480 cubic feet per second ~ 2,010,764 gallons per minute)
35 “7.16 Energy,” California Department of Water Resources, accessed March 9, 2015, http://www.water.ca.gov/
environmentalservices/docs /mntry_plus/DEIR%20–20Volume%201/07.16%20Energy.pdf;
“Table 5A. Residential Average Monthly Bill by Census Division, and State 2010,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
accessed March 9, 2012, http://www.eia.gov/electricity/sales_revenue_price/xls/table5_a.xls.
Average monthly electricity use of a California household, 2010: 562 KWh. Average household size = 2.88. (1 GWh = 1,000,000 
KWh)   (3,280 x 1,000,000) / (562 x 12 / 2.88) = 1,399,358 people
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rain fell near the Mount Wilson observatory.36 Th e geologically young San Gabriels are 
among the fastest rising mountains in the world but are being eroded almost as quickly by 
the torrential rains.37 It is these waters, powered by the force of gravity, that give the local 
hydrology its intensity. As the waters work their way down into the valleys below, they 
sweep up everything that lies in their path, eff ectively fl ushing out canyons of anything 
that is not fi rmly anchored to the earth.38 Th e urbanized region of greater Los Angeles 
is built on top of material carried down from the mountains in this way: debris cones 
(at the base of the foothills) and an alluvial plain (further down, in the basin). Th e very 
foundations of the modern metropolis constitute the accumulated evidence of past storms.
While huge boulders are carried a mile or two at the most, the water continues 
across the fl oodplain to the sea. Th is dynamic has shaped the Los Angeles River and 
the landscape of its basin. In a condition typical of rivers in semi-arid Mediterranean 
climates, the LA River only fl owed intermittently along most of its length. Its fl ows, 
during most of the year, were too meager to carve out banks, resulting in the lack 
of a clearly defi ned channel. Consequently, when the torrents of water did come, 
there was little to restrain them, and they fl owed freely across the basin, seeking out 
the path of least resistance. Th us, the river was notoriously unpredictable—after 
a major storm it was not uncommon for the river to have moved twenty miles or 
more from its previous course. Th is has happened on several occasions in the 19th 
century, when its mouth moved from Long Beach to Santa Monica and back again.
It is due to this confl uence of climate and topography that Los Angeles faces one 
of the greatest threats from fl ooding among all major American cities.39 “Th e impetus 
and fi erceness of these fl oods can be likened to that of the discharge of a bursting 
dam,” noted one of the fi rst reports produced by the Army Corps of Engineers when 
they began studying the local fl ooding problem.40 Th ese fl oods have, throughout 
recorded history, killed more people in Los Angeles County than earthquakes. In 
the 19th century, before large-scale eff orts to control the local rivers were mounted, 
major storms would leave hundreds of square miles of the LA Basin underwater. 
Evidence from the paleoclimatological record and historical accounts indicate that 
infrequent, intense fl oods have been occurring in Los Angeles for thousands of years.41
36 “Th e Climate of Los Angeles, California,” National Weather Service, 36.
37 Gumprecht, Los Angeles River, 132–34.
38 John McPhee, Th e Control of Nature (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1989), 181–272.
39 Gumprecht, Los Angeles River, 131. (At the time that Gumprecht wrote this book, LA was the most vulnerable to fl ooding, but 
the eff ects of climate change and sea level rise have made other cities more vulnerable to fl ooding since then.)
40 U.S. Engineer Offi  ce, Flood Control in the Los Angeles County Drainage Area (Los Angeles: U.S. Engineer Offi  ce, 1938), 2.
41 “Th e Climate of Los Angeles, California,” National Weather Service, 59.
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1.3.2 Th e Emergence of Institutional Flood Control
Reporting on the plans to build the Aqueduct, the Los Angeles Times published 
the headline: “Titanic Project to Give City a River.”42 It seemed that the city 
had forgotten about its original river, which by then had gone completely dry 
even in the areas where it had once fl owed year-round, due to diversions and 
pumping to supply the growing city. But the river would not disappear entirely. In 
February 1914, just a few months after William Mulholland presided over the 
debut of the city’s ‘new river’, the old river reasserted its presence in a major way.
Th e 1914 fl ood was merely one more in a long succession of fl oods that had washed 
over the LA Basin. In fact, this fl ood was not even particularly severe by historical 
standards. It was estimated that during the previous major fl ood, in 1889, the LA River’s 
peak discharge had been 65 percent greater than in 1914.43 Before the basin urbanized, 
there were fl oods, but not a fl ooding problem; the latter came only with the introduction 
of large numbers of humans into the local ecosystem. Before, during major storms, the 
river had roamed across the basin in unpredictable ways. Floodwaters would inundate 
large tracts of land, but within a few days they would fl ow out to sea or seep into the 
ground, with minimal human impacts. “Th e Indians had merely walked uphill in fl ood 
time and downhill in drought time,” ecologist Richard Gordon Lillard points out.44
What changed between 1884 and 1914 was, of course, the human factor. In 1880, there 
were just over 33,000 people residing in all of Los Angeles County. By 1910, thirty years 
later, the population had increased fi fteen-fold, to just over half a million. Th e assessed 
value of property had also increased fi fteen-fold between 1890 and 1914.45 With such rapid 
urbanization underway, an epic battle was shaping up: between the forces of nature, and 
the forces of capitalism (in the form of real estate development). Th e capricious whims of 
a dynamic natural system were quickly proving to be fundamentally incompatible with 
the static boundaries of private property. With surging demand for real estate, the city’s 
offi  cial cartographers now committed the river to a narrow, strictly defi ned corridor, and 
proceeded to divide all the surrounding land into saleable parcels.46 Mapping the river 
in this way was the fi rst step towards making the static river channel a physical reality.
Jared Orsi, in his history of fl ooding in Los Angeles, points out a peculiar coincidence: 
many of the years in which the city experienced its fastest growth were also years in which 
42 Gumprecht, Los Angeles River, 105.
43 Ibid., 177.
44 Lillard, Eden in Jeopardy, 101.
45 Richard Bigger, Flood Control in Metropolitan Los Angeles (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), 2.
46 Jared Orsi, Hazardous Metropolis: Flooding and Urban Ecology in Los Angeles (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 13.
18
Fig. 1.12 Floodwaters in Los Angeles River destroy Southern Pacifi c Railroad Bridge at North Figueroa Bridge 
(March 2, 1938)
fl oods were conspicuously absent. Of course, to newcomers, this absence was hardly 
conspicuous; for the most part, it went entirely unperceived, as they simply assumed that 
the mythology of a benevolent climate was true. Th ose who had inhabited the region for 
longer knew better; the Mexican community, for example, was aware of the great fl oods 
of the 19th century from stories told by their elders. But most newcomers dismissed these 
stories as exaggerated bits of folklore. Th us, the people who were most actively involved 
in shaping the city during this era were the people who had the least understanding 
of the dynamic local climate.47 Speculators and developers, who were subdividing new 
tracts on a daily basis, gladly seized upon the ignorance of the newcomers, selling off  
lots at the mouths of canyons, in fl oodplains, and sometimes even in dry stream beds.48
Th e 1914 fl ood, then, came as a surprise to many of the city’s residents. When 
all was said and done, the damage totaled more than $10 million (2015: $230 
million).49 For the fi rst time, there seemed to be a broad consensus that the situation 
constituted a crisis: that the river could no longer be permitted to infl ict such damage 
47 Ibid., 13–17.
48 Bigger, Flood Control in Metropolitan Los Angeles, 3.
49 Ibid., (All 2012 amounts calculated using the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Infl ation Calculator: http://www.bls.gov/data/
infl ation_calculator.htm)
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on the city and that something had to be done at once. Facing public outcry from 
all quarters, politicians vowed that the city would never again be caught unprepared.
Within one month of the fl ood, a group of fi ve engineers appointed by the county 
Board of Supervisors had set to work studying the fl ood problem. Four of the fi ve 
engineers divvied up the watershed into sub-areas, with each of them taking responsibility 
for studying and proposing fl ood control solutions in one of the areas. Th eir respective 
recommendations were then to be synthesized into a single plan. Th e fi fth engineer, 
James W. Reagan, took on the assignment of determining, for the entire county, the 
extent of areas inundated in historical deluges. When their research was completed, 
Reagan came to a radically diff erent conclusion than the other four engineers. A key 
point of contention between Reagan and the others was whether to focus on measures to 
reduce upstream causes of fl ooding (such as soil conservation and small check dams in the 
mountains), the strategy supported by the majority, or on downstream measures to contain 
fl ooding’s eff ects (levees and channel fortifi cations), the strategy that Reagan favoured.
Consonant with the prevailing ideals of the Progressive era, civic leaders had asked 
these engineers to propose the ‘best’ fl ood control solution, based on a rational analysis 
of the problem. However, unable to come to any agreement with the others, Reagan 
fi nally submitted his own minority report to the Board of Supervisors (and refused to 
show it to his colleagues beforehand).50 Th e fact that the appointed engineers had reached 
divergent conclusions, that there were multiple possible solutions and no objective way 
of assessing which was the ‘best’, belied the era’s faith in rationalized decision-making.
Apart from such questions pertaining to engineering and design, there was also 
the question of implementation. From early on, it was evident that the fl ood control 
measures being contemplated did not (and could not) fall within the purview of any 
existing government agency—an entirely new one would need to be created expressly for 
this purpose. At the state level, however, past disputes between regions (typically north 
versus south) had led to a strong tradition of home rule, and the absence of any statewide 
coordinating body. At the federal level, it would be another twenty years before the 
Army Corps’ mission was extended beyond strictly maintaining navigability. Given the 
acknowledged need for a unifi ed, region-wide approach, the only remaining space for such 
an authority to exist was at the county level.51 Th e Los Angeles County Flood Control District 
(LACFCD) was formally created in June 1915, with Reagan named to lead this authority.
Despite the initial hiccups, Orsi cites the establishment of the Flood Control District 
50 Orsi, Hazardous Metropolis, 41-42.
51 Ibid., 42-46.
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as marking the beginning of technocratic, ‘assembly-line style’ fl ood control.52 He argues 
that this approach has three distinguishing characteristics. First, it “vested much power 
in unelected experts,” a faith rooted in the desire to exclude ‘special interests’ from 
policymaking. Second, it was built upon “an alliance between governmental bodies and 
private economic interests.” Th is aligns with a pattern described by Robert Fogelson in 
Th e Fragmented Metropolis (1993), in which public authority was used “in the pursuit of 
an urban environment that maximized growth and private profi t” through infrastructural 
expansion.53 Th ird, “although the public was not literally shut out of the decision-
making process, policy debates, which so frequently revolved around technical issues 
and excluded political or moral ones, inhibited participation by nonexpert citizens.”54
In January 1917, a proposal for fl ood control improvements was submitted to the 
Board of Supervisors, and the following month it was placed on the ballot for voter 
approval. Th e package was a fairly balanced mix of upstream and downstream measures, 
a balance necessitated by the need to appeal to voters throughout the district. Several 
large dams and numerous smaller check dams would be built in the mountains, while 
the river channel between downtown Los Angeles and the ocean would be straightened 
and lined with “pile-and-wire fence” (two parallel rows of wooden piles spaced a couple 
feet apart, lined on both sides with hog wire and fi lled in the center with brush).55 Part of 
the plan also included diverting the river’s mouth one mile to the east to prevent it from 
depositing sediment in the harbor, which was becoming increasingly vital to the region’s 
economy. Despite growing public impatience with the lack of visible progress since the 
1914 fl ood, the bond passed by only a narrow margin, mostly due to the fact that the 
dispute over who should pay for the work had never really been satisfactorily resolved.56
One of the most ambitious projects ever attempted by the Flood Control District 
began in the 1920s, and is interesting as an early example of eff orts to integrate water 
supply and fl ood control. Unfortunately, despite the idea’s promise, the project ended 
in dramatic failure and was never built, leaving instead a legacy of mistrust. In May 
1924, the District submitted a bond to Los Angeles County voters for their approval. 
Th e centerpiece of the bond package was a proposal to build the tallest dam in the 
world. Th e cost, $25 million (2012: $336 mil.), was 50% more than the entire fl ood 
52 Ibid., 52.
53 Robert Fishman, introduction to Th e Fragmented Metropolis: Los Angeles, 1850-1930, by Robert M. Fogelson (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1993), xvii.
54 Orsi, Hazardous Metropolis, 53.
55 Gumprecht, Los Angeles River, 187.
56 Ibid., 191.
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control plan the engineers had proposed in 1915.57 For this large cost, however, the 
proposed dam would off er two great benefi ts. By holding back water rushing down 
from the mountains and releasing it at a controlled rate, the dam would not only 
reduce fl ooding, but would also enable more of this water to be returned to the ground, 
rather than the sea. In the lead-up to the 1924 bond vote, Reagan proclaimed that:
Th e depletion of the underground water supply in Los Angeles is alarming. Th e 
present plan of running this very much needed fl oodwater away to the sea as 
quickly as possible, in order that the rancher in the lower thirty-fi ve miles of 
the district may be protected, should be discontinued as quickly as possible.58
In addition to the fl ood control imperatives, a prolonged drought during 
those years had raised the perceived importance of water conservation among the 
public, providing the necessary base of political support to pass a bond measure. 
Unusually rapid population growth in the early 1920s, fueled by the local discovery 
of oil and the booming motion-picture industry, further emphasized the urgency 
of the water supply issue, while the larger tax base enabled the city to contemplate 
projects of a scale previously not feasible. Th e 1924 bond measure passed in a 
landslide. Shortly thereafter, however, the San Gabriel Dam project began to unravel.
On March 13, 1928, the St. Francis Dam (completed two years prior under the 
supervision of Mulholland to store water from the Los Angeles Aqueduct) collapsed, 
sending a 200-foot-high wall of water and concrete chunks weighing several thousand 
tons each surging down the Santa Clara River valley below. Th e wave of destruction (like 
a tsunami in reverse) killed more than four hundred people before it reached the ocean, 
50 miles from where the dam had been.59 In the aftermath of this tragedy, which remains 
one of the worst peacetime disasters in American history, public faith in engineering was 
badly shaken, if only temporarily. An investigation into the dam’s catastrophic failure was 
attributed to the weakness of the underlying rock. Th is prompted, for the fi rst time, an 
examination of the geology at the site of the proposed San Gabriel dam, which revealed 
a similarly hazardous level of instability. A contractor on the project, apparently already 
aware that the dam was unbuildable, was at the time being paid exorbitant rates to excavate 
material from the site on the condition that they would later build the dam at cost. A 
juicy scandal proceeded to unfold in full view of the public, featuring the mysterious 
disappearance and reappearance of key sections of certain engineering documents, and a 
57 Orsi, Hazardous Metropolis, 58.
58 Quoted in Gumprecht, Los Angeles River, 194.
59 Orsi, Hazardous Metropolis, 68; Reisner, Cadillac Desert, 97–100.
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county supervisor who was eventually sent away to the San Quentin state penitentiary.60
Th e failure of the San Gabriel dam project wrought irreparable damage on the Flood 
Control District’s credibility, seriously impairing its ability to sell the public on future 
projects, and setting off  a downward spiral that culminated in the end of locally-led fl ood 
control. Progress on installing protective measures since 1914 had been incomplete at 
best; less than half of the LA River had been lined with permanent levees, while the 
rest of its length was held in place only by the insubstantial pile-and-wire fences or by 
nothing at all.61 Meanwhile, the assessed value of property in the county had increased 
twenty-six-fold during this period and growth continued unabated as new subdivisions 
continued to be built along the city’s constantly moving periphery. Not only did these 
areas now demand fl ood protection, they contributed to the overall fl ooding problem 
by drastically increasing the amount of impervious surface in the watershed. Th us, 
when a storm hit on New Year’s Eve 1933, large areas of the county experienced fl ood 
damages. Th e hardest hit were a string of foothill communities, where 600,000 cubic 
yards of muddy debris poured down from the mountains and killed at least 49 people.62
Even after this disaster, voters refused a bond proposal in 1934 to fi nance the 
most urgently needed protection.63 Th e Flood Control District, then, found itself in 
the impossible situation of being unable to slow down or regulate new development 
that exacerbated the fl ooding problem with each passing day, and unable to secure 
the funding necessary to build adequate fl ood protection. Th e end was drawing near.
One signifi cant and recurring theme during this era of local fl ood control was 
that problems in the legal and administrative structure, specifi cally with overly rigid 
restrictions on the way that bonds could be used, served as impediments to eff ective 
action. Because bond measures were placed on the ballot for specifi c amounts of money 
to fi nance specifi c projects, the major design elements had to be determined in advance. 
Consequently, public input was essentially limited to a “yea” or “nay” to preconceived 
designs (and not even to individual projects, but rather to bundles of projects).64 Once 
funds had been allotted in this way, the law required that they be spent on the specifi c 
designs that the voters had ostensibly approved. Th is limited the Flood Control District’s 
ability to explore alternative designs in response to considerations that arose later in the 
60 Orsi, Hazardous Metropolis, 61–72.
61 Gumprecht, Los Angeles River, 199.
62 Ibid., 203.
63 Ibid., 205.
64 Orsi, Hazardous Metropolis, 48–49, 53.
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process; funds could not even be legally used to study alternatives.65 Th e District was also 
prohibited from using funds for what might be called preventative, or non-structural 
measures, such as disseminating information to the public on which areas faced the greatest 
fl ood hazards.66 Th ough these restrictions were born out of good intentions, namely to 
prevent graft and promote the effi  cient use of funds, they ended up having a crippling 
eff ect, continually impeding the very goal of effi  ciency that they sought to uphold.
1.3.3 Th e Olmsted Plan | the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
By the 1930s, a ‘perfect storm’ was brewing that would soon herald the next major phase in 
the river’s evolution. In 1935, the Flood Control District had grown desperate and beseeched 
the federal government for assistance, fi ling a request for WPA funds to implement its 1931 
plan. President Roosevelt approved the application, assigning the Army Corps of Engineers 
to supervise the work, and by the end of that year the Corps had arrived in Los Angeles.67
A number of historical circumstances gave additional momentum to the Army 
Corps’ engagement with the LA River. Th e Flood Control Act passed by Congress in 
1936 gave the Army Corps greater prominence nationwide, as they began taking on 
“improvement” projects on a number of America’s major waterways. Th e geologist 
Robert Mount observes that in engineering circles, “major surgery on the fl uvial system 
is routinely referred to as ‘river improvement,’ as if nature just didn’t quite get it right 
the fi rst time.”68 With the nation still in the depths of the Great Depression, there was 
a desire for projects that would generate employment in large numbers, and what Los 
Angeles had in mind fi t this bill. Within months after the Army Corps’ work began, 
some 17,000 men had been hired from local relief rolls to work on the project.69 More 
generally, this era was marked by a widespread faith in technology and engineering as 
solutions to the social and environmental problems affl  icting humanity, in accordance 
with the beliefs and goals of early 20th century modernism. Th e Corps’ work likely 
would have proceeded without any further affi  rmation, but this came nonetheless in the 
form of another fl ood in March 1938 (see Figure 1.12). Th is fl ood, the worst in the city’s 
history before or since, with 87 deaths and $78 million (2012: $1.27 billion) in damages, 
silenced most lingering doubts about sealing the river’s fate in concrete.70 And nothing 
65 Ibid., 64.
66 Ibid., 89.
67 Gumprecht, Los Angeles River, 206.
68 Mount, California Rivers and Streams, 292–94.
69 Gumprecht, Los Angeles River, 207.
70 Ibid., 216.
24
Olmsted-Bartholomew
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Fig. 1.13 Olmsted-Bartholomew masterplan for Los Angeles region
Fig. 1.14 Olmsted-Bartholomew—parkway sections
25
less than concrete would do. Originally, plans had called for unlined channels in the 
river’s lower reaches. But during the 1938 fl ood, numerous levee failures convinced the 
Corps’ engineers to reevaluate their design. Given the nature of the work that the river 
would be required to perform, conveying enormous volumes of water at high speeds, the 
Corps’ engineers concluded that it would be necessary to cover both the sides and bottom 
of the channel in reinforced concrete along virtually the entire length of the river.71
Local reaction to the arrival of the Army Corps on the scene was, by and 
large, quite positive. For most, there was a feeling of relief. After years of bungled 
work under local leadership, in common perception, the Army Corps’ expertise 
in effi  cient project management would be the city’s salvation. Better still, from 
now on the money to pay for fl ood control would be coming from the federal 
government, rather than local taxpayers; it appeared to be an all-around windfall.72
Still, the sentiment was not entirely unanimous. Th e Municipal League of Los 
Angeles argued that “engineers think of fl ood control problems only in terms of 
mechanics and hydraulics. Th e biologic factors and the economic and social aspects 
are every bit as important.”73 Th ey therefore advocated an approach that situated 
fl ood control within an integrated regional planning program that included forest 
and soil conservation, fi re prevention, and zoning. Carey McWilliams, writing in 
1946 (less than a decade after the Corps’ arrival), also critiqued the city’s heavy 
reliance on structural methods of fl ood control and argued instead for hazard zoning:
Flood control has, in fact, become a major political setup in Los Angeles, the basis 
of which is to build more cement causeways so that surface waters may be carried to 
the ocean as swiftly as possible and with the minimum damage to extensive property 
holdings which have been built in areas that should have been zoned against occupancy.74
Mike Davis made the same point half a century later, in his essay “How Eden Lost 
Its Garden,” tracing the idea back to a plan prepared in 1930 by the fi rm of Olmsted & 
Bartholomew.75 Th at plan, entitled “Parks, Playgrounds, and Beaches for the Los Angeles 
Region,” (referred to hereafter as the ‘Olmsted plan’) (see Figure 1.13) proposed setting 
aside wide buff ers along many of the region’s rivers and streams. Th ese interconnected 
71 Ibid., 220–21.
72 Ibid., 208.
73 Quoted in Orsi, Hazardous Metropolis, 109.
74 McWilliams, Island on the Land, 195.
75 Mike Davis, “How Eden Lost Its Garden: A Political History of the Los Angeles Landscape,” in Th e City: Los Angeles and Urban 
Th eory at the End of the Twentieth Century, ed. Allen John Scott and Edward W. Soja (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1996), 160–85; Olmsted Brothers and Bartholomew and Associates, Parks, Playgrounds and Beaches for the Los Angeles Region: 
A Report Submitted to the Citizens’ Committee on Parks, Playgrounds, and Beaches (Los Angeles: Citizens’ Committee, 1930).
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corridors (which the planners gave the whimsical title of “pleasureway parks”) (see Figure 
1.14) would collectively form a 440-mile-long network of open space extending through 
greater Los Angeles, connecting the mountains to the sea. Signifi cantly, these parklands 
would serve the additional purpose of hazard mitigation, allowing the rivers room to 
expand during high fl ow conditions without any harm to life or property. Ancillary 
benefi ts would include the contribution of these open spaces to groundwater recharge 
as sites for percolation, and their ability to improve what Kevin Lynch would call the 
‘imageability’ of the LA Basin’s vast, repetitive grid, by breaking it up into smaller units. 
Th e network of ‘pleasureway parks’ envisioned in the plan would include three east-
west corridors: one running along the Pacifi c coast, another running along the base of the 
San Gabriel Mountains, and a third in the middle connecting several smaller hill ranges. 
Six north-south corridors would run from mountains to sea, paralleling several of the 
region’s rivers and streams, including three separate segments of the Los Angeles River 
totaling 17.6 miles. Th ese corridors would range in width from a minimum of 300 feet 
to a maximum of 1000 feet or more, enough to allow fl oodwaters to spread beyond the 
confi nes of an engineered channel. River banks would be landscaped with native trees, 
such as cottonwoods, sycamores, willows, and poplars. All told, these linear parks would 
encompass an area of about 70,000 acres, including 16,000 acres of land then already in 
public ownership (for comparison, Griffi  th Park, the largest in Los Angeles, is 4,310 acres). 
Th e plan estimated the total cost for this system at $143.9 million (2012: $1.98 billion), 
of which about two thirds was for acquisition and one third was for improvements.76
Th e Olmsted plan off ers a remarkable alternative perspective on the fl ooding 
problem in Los Angeles. All previous eff orts had focused on treating the problem’s 
symptoms, searching for the most eff ective way of containing the waters to minimize 
damage to property, and had addressed this problem in isolation (with the notable 
exception of eff orts to integrate water conservation in the 1920s). Th e Olmsted plan 
took a completely diff erent approach, stepping back to consider the underlying causes 
of the problem, namely the indiscriminate spread of urbanization with no regard 
for the region’s natural systems. With prescient insight, the plan points out how any 
approach that merely treats the symptoms is self-defeating and eventually bound to fail. 
Th e Olmsted fi rm had raised the issue of zoning to prevent development in 
fl ood-prone areas as early as 1926, in a letter to the county Board of Supervisors:
In the absence of proper legal control of building operations on such lands, 
76 Olmsted and Bartholomew, Parks, Playgrounds and Beaches, 95–138.
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it is as certain as anything can be that, partly through ignorance and partly 
through unscrupulousness, these areas will be largely developed in such a 
manner that in every period of heavy rainfall not only will streets be submerged 
but the waters will rise over the fl oors of houses and other buildings, causing 
enormous inconvenience and economic loss, creating seriously unsanitary 
conditions, and tending to produce the most objectionable of slums.77
Th e letter urges that these areas be acquired for recreational purposes, but notes “this 
can be done at the price of agricultural land if, and only if, speculators are restrained 
from developing and marketing building lots on low lands.”78 Noting that similarly low-
lying areas in Boston had been subject to such regulations for the past 70 years (i.e. since 
the 1850s), the letters points out “the dangers of uncontrolled private development” 
on low-lying lands “are much more insidious in the Los Angeles district than in eastern 
seaboard cities because extreme fl uctuations in rainfall here make most of these low lands 
during dry seasons much less unattractive for building operations than in the East.”79
A thoughtful analysis of real estate economics was central to the Olmsted plan. Th e 
plan explained how the region’s critical shortage of open space was the result of unrestrained 
speculation that had artifi cially infl ated land values. In such a situation, the profi ts to 
be made by developing every square foot of land were an irresistible temptation. Faced 
with such a stacked deck, public parkland didn’t stand a chance. Th e fundamental reason 
that development had spread even to risky areas, the plan argued, was a misallocation of 
costs and benefi ts. Because the cost of protecting these areas from natural hazards “does 
not fall on the purchaser alone, and scarcely ever on the vendor, but most heavily on the 
community at large,” the most elemental incentive for not building in these areas was 
removed.80 Th e plan goes on to describe how instituting total or partial restrictions on 
development in hazardous areas such as fl oodplains would not only lessen the amount of 
public money spent on building costly protective infrastructure, it would also drive down 
the market value of these lands, making it far more feasible to acquire them for public use.
Th e plan was also astute in its political positioning, making the case that a 
continuation of the status quo posed a grave threat to the region’s scenic beauty, 
widely acknowledged as the very engine driving the whole growth machine. 
Th is argument simultaneously appealed to the idealistic sensibilities of civic 
reformers, and the pragmatic self-interest of developers and other boosters.
77 Ibid., 149.
78 Ibid., 151. 
79 Ibid., 151.
80 Ibid., 14.
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Unfortunately, once the fi rm of Olmsted & Bartholomew handed over “Parks, 
Playgrounds, and Beaches” to the Chamber of Commerce, the plan was quietly shelved.81 
Th ough some of its recommendations were later realized by virtue of coincidence, 
the plan as a whole was never implemented. Th e precise reasons for this can only be 
guessed at, but Mike Davis blames the plan’s silent death on the “selfi sh, profi t-driven 
presentism [that] ruled Southern California.”82 Davis claims that the plan’s vision of 
“a dramatically enlarged Commons…alarmed guardians of Los Angeles’ reputation as 
the capital of antiradicalism and the open shop.”83 Moreover, he argues, the number of 
jobs that the Army Corps project would generate had the eff ect of aligning local labor 
unions with the conservative guardians of big business, forming an indomitable alliance. 
Davis also describes how, as far back as 1917 (when the Flood Control District’s fi rst 
bond measure was being debated), large fl oodplain landholders such as the Southern 
Pacifi c Railroad staged a campaign of fearmongering propaganda targeting the working-
class homeowners who also lived in fl ood-prone areas (and still do, particularly south 
of downtown). Th e river, claimed this campaign, had the potential to cause “a calamity 
equal to that of Johnstown or Galveston,” unless it were brought under the control of 
man.84 Indeed, preying on the public’s fears has always been an eff ective way of building 
support for the most expedient solution and squelching discussion of any alternatives.
Ironically, the plan’s authors actually predicted its fate, observing that
the rapid growth of population, which makes the rapid expansion of park-system 
facilities so urgent, also makes its fi nancing particularly diffi  cult, because the 
capital investment required for the fi rst requirements of a new population, such 
as buildings, streets, sewers, and water supply, is exceptionally high in proportion 
to the present population. Th e benefi t of parks bought now will accrue largely 
in future years… We can get along without them a while longer, anyhow…we 
would rather use our money to get lots on speculation for personal profi t than 
give it up in taxes for our share of a park system. It is perhaps harder, fi nancially 
and politically, for Los Angeles to get parks than for any other such community. 
Th e real question is, how far will the people…be able to meet the test?85
Landscape architect Laurie Olin speculates that the plan was hidden away because 
it threatened to upset the established power structure, to take away infl uence from 
the very group that had commissioned it (the Chamber of Commerce). He says:
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It is rather like a proposal we made recently to the University of California in Berkeley, 
where we said, “Yes, we can do a plan for Berkeley, but only if the University allows us 
to have direct access to the President and some of the Regents. We have to reorganize 
how you manage capital projects; otherwise there’s no point in it…We made the 
presentation to middle management, to whom we were essentially saying we’re going 
to go over you, around you, reorganize you. Needless to say, we didn’t get the job.86
Likewise, it seems as if the clients for the Olmsted plan had expected the landscape 
architects to produce a simple beautifi cation plan, but ended up getting way more than 
they had bargained for. Sensing the threat to their own power, their self-preservation 
instinct kicked in, and they stifl ed the whole thing, lest the provocative idea leak out and 
expand beyond their control. Th e only way around this kind of response, Olin believes, is 
to take the vision to the public, as they (and not out-of-town landscape architects) are the 
ones who are in a position to agitate for change. “Only local residents can harangue their 
government and force them to do these things,” says Olin.87 It is interesting to consider how 
things might have turned out diff erently if the Olmsted vision had been widely publicized 
—if this vision of a potential future had been adopted and advocated for by local citizens.
Blake Gumprecht, author of the most comprehensive history of the LA River, seems 
to rationalize the city’s failure to implement the plan, off ering a variety of reasons for 
deeming it unfeasible. He notes that “the huge $230.1 million price tag was seven times 
the entire budget of the city of Los Angeles in 1930,” and that declining property values 
with the onset of the Great Depression could have made local offi  cials “understandably 
reluctant to pursue a program that would take perhaps another 100,000 acres off 
property tax rolls.” He contends that the plan “would have increased the cost of fl ood 
control because of the high price of real estate in Southern California.”88 However, 
justifi cations such as these overlook the plan’s central premise, that limiting development 
in hazardous areas through zoning would have the dual eff ects of reducing expenditures 
for structural fl ood control and making the land more aff ordable for public acquisition. 
Th e issue of fi nancing does raise another interesting prospect, however. It is true that in 
1930, the city’s fi nances were largely tapped out, due to the very causes described in the 
plan, namely the disproportionately high expenditures on streets, aqueducts, and other 
infrastructure needed to support low-density living in a semi-arid environment. Imagine, 
though, what if the infusion of federal money that came with the Army Corps had been 
used to implement the Olmsted plan, instead of building conventional fl ood control?
86 Laurie Olin, “Th e Power of Diction,” interview by Greg Hise and William Francis Deverell, in Eden by Design: Th e 1930 
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Los Angeles River Channelization
Sections as-built by the Army Corps of  Engineers
at Tujunga Avenue
drainage area: 401.0 square miles
above Arroyo Seco
drainage area: 511.0 square miles
below Firestone Blvd.
drainage area: 596.0 square miles
below Wardlow River Rd.
drainage area: 815.0 square miles
Fig. 1.15 Sections as-built by the US Army Corps of Engineers
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Gumprecht also argues that the plan’s recommendations “were not true fl ood control 
proposals” because they did not include technical specifi cations, and faults “designers 
like Olmsted, who too seldom realized that, to reach the engineers, they had to speak 
their language.”89 In a general respect, there is some validity to this point. However, it 
is unreasonable to expect a plan for parks and open space, particularly one operating at 
the scale of a vast region, and one that was commissioned by a decidedly non-technical 
audience (the Chamber of Commerce), to provide this level of technical detail. Th is 
expectation misunderstands the purpose and function of such a planning document, 
which is more about off ering a vision of what could be, an idea compelling enough to 
galvanize broad political support. If a plan is eff ective in instigating the public’s desire 
to realize its vision, then engineers (ideally, working in close collaboration with the 
landscape architects) are quite capable of translating that vision into technical specifi cs.
Th e Olmsted plan is noteworthy for both the boldness of its vision and its careful 
attention to detail. Still, it is not entirely clear that the wide river corridors it proposed 
would have been feasible even at that relatively early stage in the city’s development. 
Zoning ordinances prohibiting development in the fl oodplain had in fact been proposed 
at least once even before the Olmsted plan. Th ese were never adopted, however, because of 
concerns that they would not withstand legal challenges, and (more importantly) because 
they contradicted the strongly pro-growth ethos of city leaders.90 As a result, much of the 
land along the river had already been developed into a mix of industrial, commercial, and 
residential districts by the 1930s. Just to acquire a corridor of the minimum possible width, 
the Flood Control District had to spend large amounts of money buying back land. Th is 
included the actual channel of the river, much of which had fallen into private ownership 
because the river was not considered navigable and only intermittently contained water. 
Even in places that appeared undeveloped, land had already been subdivided and sold, 
and plans and permits were already in place. Whether or not it was too late to stop such 
development from actually being built may be a matter of opinion, but in Gumprecht’s 
view, by the 1930s “the time had long since passed in which the river may have been 
allowed to fl ow relatively unhindered through a wider, more natural fl oodplain.”91
From this perspective, Olmsted’s plan appears less than realistic in its treatment of the 
rivers, having come just a few years too late. On the other hand, there were instances where 
constraints less fl exible than a desire for open space forced engineers to consider alternatives. 
89 Ibid., 270, 349.
90 Ibid., 209.
91 Ibid., 215.
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Fig. 1.16 Los Angeles River watershed—impervious surfaces
Los Angeles River Watershed
Impervious Surfaces
For example, parts of the river channel were so hemmed in by topography (through the 
Glendale Narrows) or existing development (through downtown) that engineers deemed 
the cheapest option to be construction of a large fl ood control reservoir (the Sepulveda 
Basin) to hold the water upstream, even though this would require acquiring thousands 
of prime, buildable acres in the San Fernando valley. Th is proved that almost anything 
was possible given enough money, and that economic calculations (always based on an 
invisible set of assumptions and values) ultimately dictated what could or could not be built.
In the section that details recommendations for the individual parkway sections, the 
Olmsted plan makes occasional reference to designs for fl ood control channels then under 
consideration. Referring to one at Ballona Creek, it notes with uncanny prescience that 
“such a channel if merely walled in is likely to become a very ugly feature in the district, 
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standing empty and dry most of the year, a receptacle for papers and rubbish”92 (see Figure 
1.15). Unfortunately, this is precisely what happened. After a brief hiatus during World 
War II, the Army Corps’ work on the river proceeded day and night throughout the 
1950s. By the time the project was completed in the late 1960s, more than 90 percent 
of the river bed had been lined in concrete, at a cost of more than $3 billion (in 2015 
dollars).93 Th e river had also undergone a semantic transformation: from hence forth, it 
would be offi  cially referred to as the “Los Angeles County Drainage Area” (LACDA).
Looking back at the Army Corps’ ‘improvements’ to the river, there are several points 
that deserve mentioning. Most signifi cant among these is the Corps’ neglect to incorporate 
water conservation in their fl ood control program. A report published by the Army Corps 
in 1938, as it was preparing to begin its 30-year-long project in Los Angeles, does make 
reference to “the necessity of conserving as much as is possible of the discharging fl ood 
waters to replenish the ground water storage, heavily depleted in recent years, and on 
which the life of much of the region depends.”94 Th e report claims that the fl ood control 
basins the Corps proposed to build would address the conservation issue by “holding 
the water so that it can be released at a rate which will permit increased percolation into 
the streambed, thereby conserving much of the run-off  which would otherwise waste 
into the ocean.”95 However, the report does not explain how such percolation could 
possibly occur when more than 90 percent of that streambed was lined in concrete. 
Moreover, operational policy dictated that water be released from these fl ood control 
basins as quickly as it was possible to do without causing fl ooding downstream, rather 
than at the much slower rate necessary for optimal percolation, so that the basins would 
be empty and ready to accommodate the next storm whenever it hit. It seems clear that 
conservation was an afterthought, to the extent that it received any consideration at all.
Designs constraints alone cannot account for this neglect, as demonstrated by 
the emphasis given to conservation in the Flood Control District’s 1931 plan, which 
claimed that its proposed measures could conserve enough water to meet the needs 
of nearly half a million people.96 Th e Flood Control District has, in fact, carried out 
a conservation program concurrently with the fl ood control program it manages 
jointly with the Army Corps. Th is is accomplished through what are called “spreading 
grounds”, large, shallow basins with highly permeable soils, located adjacent to rivers. 
92 Olmsted and Bartholomew, Parks, Playgrounds and Beaches, 115.
93 Gumprecht, Los Angeles River, 206–07, 222–24. Total is my estimate, based on sum of infl ation-adjusted expenditures.
94 U.S. Engineer Offi  ce, Flood Control in the Los Angeles County Drainage Area, 3.
95 Ibid., 4.
96 Gumprecht, Los Angeles River, 202.
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During storms, water is diverted into the spreading grounds, where it can percolate 
into the ground and recharge aquifers. During dry periods, the spreading grounds are 
fi lled with treated wastewater and (rather counter-intuitively) with water imported from 
afar via the system of aqueducts.97 In this way, the District has managed to conserve 
an average of 274,982 acre-feet (89.6 billion gallons) per year.98 However, this system 
has been operated solely at the initiative of the county. “Because conservation could 
not be justifi ed on navigational or national defense grounds, it did not fall within 
the jurisdiction of the Army Corps,” explains Orsi.99 Gumprecht also points out that 
while the Flood Control Act of 1936 allocated many millions of dollars for the Army 
Corps’ work, upstream conservation measures proposed by the Forest Service and the 
Soil Conservation Service were given short shrift.100 Part of the explanation for the 
declining political will to implement water conservation measures doubtlessly relates to 
the completion of the Colorado River Aqueduct in 1941. To short-sighted politicians 
and the public, this signaled (once again) the arrival of unlimited water abundance.
Another trend associated with the Army Corps’ takeover of local fl ood control 
was the continuation, and indeed the strengthening, of the technocratic regime. No 
longer reliant on voter-approved bonds, fl ood control became even more removed 
from public involvement. One rare exception to this rule occurred in a case where one 
of the Corps’ proposals adversely impacted a well-heeled, well-organized, and well-
connected constituency, as was the case in a controversy over the Whittier Narrows 
Dam in the 1940s. Th e dam, which formed part of one of the fl ood control basins 
proposed by the Corps, threatened to occasionally inundate the town of El Monte. 
Residents of the town formed a committee to oppose the plan and, using their 
own funds, hired a team of engineers to design a counter-proposal. Doggedly 
working their political connections, the citizens of El Monte eventually forced the 
Corps to accept a compromise design that spared their town.101 Such cases of active 
public involvement in shaping fl ood control policy were exceedingly rare, however.
97 Th e rationale behind the use of imported water relates to the fact that this water is less expensive during the winter and, once 
stored in local aquifers, can be pumped out in the summer when demand peaks.
98 “Imported and Recycled Water Delivered in Acre-Feet, Water Year: 2011-2012,” Los Angeles County Department of Public 
Works, http://dpw.lacounty.gov/wrd/spreadingground/watercon/fi le/Imported%20&%20Reclaimed%20Data%202011–2012.
pdf.
1 acre foot ~ 325,851 gallons. Th ough 89.6 billion gallons may seem like a very large amount, it is only a small fraction of all the 
precipitation that falls in the watershed, and a small fraction of the region’s total water usage. See also Los Angeles & San Gabriel 
Rivers Watershed Council, Water Augmentation Study, http://www.usbr.gov/lc/socal/reports/LASGwtraugmentation/report.pdf, 
ES-2; and Los Angeles & San Gabriel Rivers Watershed Council, Ground Water Augmentation Model, http://www.usbr.gov/lc/
socal/reports/LASGwtraugmentation/AppC.pdf, 14.
99 Orsi, Hazardous Metropolis, 117.
100 Gumprecht, Los Angeles River, 207–8.
101 Orsi, Hazardous Metropolis, 120–28.
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Despite the prevalence of the technocratic approach, the design of fl ood control 
works was less scientifi c than it appeared, and relied to a considerable extent on leaps 
of faith and trial-and-error. For example, debris basins, which eventually formed an 
integral part of the overall fl ood control battalion, were discovered by accident, 
as related by John McPhee in his essay “Los Angeles Against the Mountains”:
Strung out along the San Gabriel front are at least a hundred and twenty bowl-shaped 
excavations that resemble football stadiums and often as large. Years ago, when a big 
storm left back yards and boulevards fi ve feet deep in scree, one neighborhood came 
through amazingly unscathed, because it happened to surround a gravel pit that 
had fi lled up instead. A tungsten fi lament went on somewhere above Los Angeles.102
In designing the components of their fl ood control program, the Corps faced a 
double challenge: a lack of historical data on climate and streamfl ow, and the diffi  culty 
of predicting the rate and locations of future urbanization in the region. In 1938, the 
oldest weather records in all of Los Angeles County only went back 65 years. Streamfl ow 
records went back only half as far, at best, and generally had only been collected for the 
mountainous upper reaches of streams. In the basin, where most of the population lived, 
data was virtually nonexistent.103 “In Los Angeles County,” stated the Corps’ report, “the 
stream records are so short, the improvement works so recent, the fl ood peaks so fl ashy, 
and the population increasing so rapidly, that ‘height’ or ‘fl ood stage’ has not come to be 
the criterion that it is in the East or Middle West.”104 Given such a severe paucity of the data 
normally used as the basis for design, the Corps’ engineers resorted to such unconventional 
sources as the diaries of Mission fathers; ultimately they were forced to make a best guess. 
Unfortunately, several decades later it would become clear that the assumptions upon 
which the whole system was founded deviated substantially from the present-day reality.
Th ough the Army Corps has borne a great deal of the blame for ruining the 
Los Angeles River, this history shows that by the time they arrived in Los Angeles, 
the situation had reached a point where they often had few options other than 
to pave the river. Th e real culprit here is the close relationship  between property 
developers and local political leadership, which resulted in widespread and 
problematic development in the fl oodplain during the city’s years of explosive growth.
1.4. Drought, Conservation and an Uncertain Future
102 McPhee, Control of Nature, 192.
103 U.S. Engineer Offi  ce, Flood Control in the Los Angeles County Drainage Area, 21–22.
104 Ibid., 29.
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Fig. 1.17 Southwest USA—drought intensity (2005-2014)
Fig. 1.18 Reservoir levels in California (2015)
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Fig. 1.19 California—drought intensity (October 6, 2015)
California
Drought Intensity(October 6, 2015)
1.4.1. Drought Today
California has experienced many droughts throughout its recorded history. Its most 
signifi cant historical state-wide droughts were the six-year drought of 1929-34, the 
drought of 1976-77, and the six-year event of 1987-92. Th ese were the most notable 
due to their duration or extreme hydrological conditions. Th e 1929-34 event occurred 
within the context of a decades-plus dry period in the 1920s-30s that aff ected much of 
central and southwest USA; the proverbial ‘dust bowl’. Th e drought’s impacts, however, 
were relatively small by present-day standards since the level of urban and agricultural 
development was far less extensive than that of modern times. Th e 1976-77 drought, 
although brief in duration, was notable for the severity of its hydrology and the drought 
of 1987-92 was California’s fi rst extended dry period since the 1920s-30s, providing the 
closest comparison for drought impacts under a contemporary level of development.
Th e water years of 2012-14 are California’s driest three consecutive years in terms 
of state-wide precipitation (see Figures 1.17 and 1.19). While statistics for the 2014-2015 
water year are not yet in, this drought has continued with little foreseeable relief in sight. 
California’s previous drought occurred in 2007-09 and was the fi rst drought for which a 
state-wide proclamation of emergency was issued. In January 2015, Governor Edmund 
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Fig. 1.20 Homes in Rancho Mirage, Calif., in the Coachella Valley
Fig. 1.21 A housing development in Cathedral City, near Palm Springs
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Fig. 1.22 Los Angeles—water use per capita (1972-2012)
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‘Jerry’  Brown declared a drought State of Emergency and issued an executive order on April 
1, 2015 that directed the State Water Resources Control Board to impose an aggregate 25 
percent reduction on the state’s 400 water agencies. Each agency will be responsible for the 
implementation of this reduction and the regulations through which this reduction will 
be achieved. Th e 25 percent is a state-wide benchmark, with a range of reduction targets 
among individual municipalities and water agencies, depending on their water use levels. 
For example, the city of Arcadia has a 36 percent water reduction mandate, as they were 
among the municipalities with the highest water use per capita before the executive order.105
Th e drought occurred at a time of record warmth in California, with new climate 
records set in 2014 for state-wide average temperatures. Records for minimum annual 
precipitation were set in many communities in calendar year 2013. Calendar year 2014 
saw record-low water allocations for State Water Project and federal Central Valley 
Project contractors. Reduced surface water availability triggered increased groundwater 
pumping, with groundwater levels in many parts of the state dropping 50 to 100 feet 
below their previous historical lows. As of October 2015, the majority of the greater Los 
Angeles area, which includes Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino and Ventura 
counties, were characterized as experiencing “D4” or “exceptional” drought conditions.106
It is a common public perception that California, and more specifi cally, Los 
Angeles, is extremely misguided and wasteful in its water use, boasting vast expanses 
of suburban landscapes replete with swimming pools, manicured lawns and gardens 
overfl owing with lush foliage—all in the midst of what is, ostensibly, a desert. 
While there is considerable evidence to support this notion, the truth is much more 
105 City of Arcadia, Accessed October 12, 2015, http://www.ci.arcadia.ca.us/home/index.asp.
106 US Drought Monitor Map Archive, Accessed October 23, 2015, http://droughtmonitor.unl.edu/MapsAndData/MapArchive.
aspx
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Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta
Environmental issues that range from habitat destruction, levee adequacy, and increased
water salinity make the projection of future water supplies difﬁcult to calculate. The possibility
of drastically lowered water availability is always a possibility.
Owens River Watershed and Mono Lake
Court-ordered environmental reparations have reduced the availability of water supply to the
Los Angeles aqueduct system. As with the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta, future
supply is difﬁcult to calculate in the face of the climactic uncertainty wrought by climate change.
Colorado River
The uncertainty of future supply due to climate change uncertainty as well as the growth of
Las Vegas and Phoenix, two other major consumers of this river’s watershed present a future
of diminished water supply for Los Angeles.
Local Aquifers
Extensive soil contamination from wide-ranging industrial sites pose a serious threat to
future supply from local groundwater sources.
LEGEND
Ú Dam
A Dust Control
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Fig. 1.23 Map of Los Angeles’ water sources
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Fig. 1.24 Los Angeles’ water supply volumes by source
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complex and nuanced. Th is phenomenon is observed largely in higher income 
neighbourhoods107, and is, thus, more of an exception, rather than the rule. Also, 
profl igate water use tends to occur mainly in single-family residential land uses 
(see Figures 120 and 1.21), while larger-scale and public sector landscaping tends to 
employ a much greater degree of water effi  ciency and use of recycled water resources.
Los Angeles has also promoted a multitude of water conservation measures since 
the 1970’s, resulting in an aggregate decrease in water use of 34.9 percent since 1972. 
Per capita water use in 1972 was 715.4 L per capita per day (subsequently referred to as 
L/c/d), 673.8 L/c/d in 1982, and 522.4 L/c/d in 1992. Water use increased in the next 
ten years, to 598.1 L/c/d in 2002, then decreased to 465.6 L/c/d in 2012108 (see Figure 
1.21). Th is decrease can be attributed, in part, to the improved effi  ciency of household 
plumbing fi xtures, the increased use of recycled water for landscaping and growing public 
awareness of the importance of water conservation. Another factor that has contributed 
to declining water use in California over the last few decades is the declining water 
availability from the Colorado River due to rapid population growth in the southwest USA 
in cities such as Las Vegas and Phoenix. Until Arizona and Nevada had enough demand 
107 Bardach, Anne Louise, “Lifestyles of the Rich and Parched: How the Golden State’s one percenters are avoiding the drought,” 
Politico Magazine, August 24, 2014, Accessed July 18, 2015, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/08/california-
drought-lifestyles-of-the-rich-and-parched-110305_full.html#.Vi-2p2v-XOu.
108 “DWP per capita Water Use,” Accessed October 19, 2014, https://data.lacity.org/dataset/DWP-Per-Capita-Water-Use/huph-
ykwx.
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to claim the water withdrawals allotted to them, California received the unclaimed water.
If Governor Brown’s 25 percent state-wide reduction in water use is 
achieved, water consumption will be decreased to 349.2 L/c/d. Th ese eff orts at 
conservation and decreased water use, however, may be insuffi  cient to address a 
future in which water supply is subject to a great deal of uncertainty and the only 
certainty is that there will not be more water available to meet growing demands.
1.4.2. Th e Urban/Rural Divide in the Drought
A controversy that has emerged during the drought has been the disproportionate water 
use of the agricultural sector, which accounts for 80% of all human water use in California, 
but contributes less than 2 percent to the overall GDP of the state.109 While California’s 
agricultural industry is by far the largest, on a per-state basis, in the USA, its contribution 
to the overall economy of the state is dwarfed by other high-value economic sectors such 
as the high-tech, fi nance, real estate, tourism, and entertainment industries (see Figure 1.25).
Th is is not to suggest that the role of agriculture should only be considered in strictly 
economic terms—food, obviously, is an essential human need and should not be merely 
considered a commodity like any other. Th e current drought, however, has raised relevant 
questions about the sustainability of the present scale of agricultural operations and the 
effi  ciency of its practices, in terms of water use. Th is issue is complex and critical to the 
future of California, but is beyond the scope of this thesis, other than a brief examination 
to illustrate the larger context in which urban water issues in Los Angeles are embedded.
In addition to the imbalance in water use and economic importance between 
agricultural and urban sectors, the 25 percent reduction in water use mandated by the 
governor does not apply to the agricultural sector, which has caused a great deal of 
head-scratching and consternation across the state. However, many farms are receiving 
little water while others continue to receive their allotted water supply. Th e laws 
governing rights to water withdrawal are archaic remnants of the 19th century—basically 
a fi rst-come, fi rst-served scenario, in terms of historical land ownership. Th e existence 
of over 400 water supply districts and agencies in California, with no single agency 
holding the power to draft and implement comprehensive plans, further complicates 
already convoluted and ineffi  cient allocation mechanisms. One positive development 
that one would hope could arise from this current drought is the creation of an 
independent, state-wide water agency with a mandate strong enough to implement 
109 Mechel Paggi, California Agriculture’s Role in the Economy and Water Use Characteristics, (Fresno, CA: Th e Center for 
Agricultural Business, California State University, Fresno, 2011.)
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Evidence from tree rings shows that drought was historically much more widespread in the American West than now.
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Fig. 1.29 Southwest USA—historical drought patterns
and enforce the comprehensive and well-considered plans the state is producing.
1.4.3. Drought, Deep History and Climate Change
Th e combination of decreased precipitation and higher temperatures has made this 
drought especially concerning, with each of these factors exacerbating the other. A critical 
aspect of this current drought is the record low snowpack in the Sierra Mountains. Th e 
mountain snowpack serves a crucial function, regulating the inter-year variations in water 
availability and acting, ostensibly, as a giant reservoir. Water is stored in the form of snow 
during the traditionally wet months of winter, and is released as snow melt that feeds 
streamfl ow, which provides water resources for the dry summer months. Th is seasonal 
fl ow is a crucial component of California’s water supply regimen, but the current drought 
has called the future availability of this water into question. Current snowpack levels are 
5 percent of normal—a 500-year low—and have diminished signifi cantly within the last 
year (see Figures 1.27 and 1.28). In addition, rising temperatures caused by anthropogenic 
climate change are likely to adversely aff ect the level of snowpack in the future.
While drought has consistently recurred over the last 150 years, a study 
published by Edward R. Cook et al suggests that, in the southwest USA, drought 
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conditions may be the norm, not just the trough of a recurrent wet-dry cycle.
Th e western United States is experiencing a severe multiyear drought that is 
unprecedented in some hydroclimatic records. Using gridded drought reconstructions 
that cover most of the western United States over the past 1200 years, the data indicates 
that this drought pales in comparison to an earlier period of elevated aridity and epic 
drought in AD 900 to 1300, an interval broadly consistent with the Medieval Warm 
Period (see Figure 1.29). If elevated aridity in the western United States is a natural 
response to climate warming, then any trend toward warmer temperatures in the future 
could lead to a serious long term increase in aridity over western North America.110
Th is research suggests that the 20th century was an abnormally wet period when 
considered in terms of the extended temporal scale of centuries and millennia represented 
by paleoclimatological records. Elevated global temperatures in the Middle Ages, as referred 
to in the above quote, resulted in drought conditions that lasted centuries, not years. While 
the elevated temperatures expected due to climate change may not produce similar eff ects, 
it would be prudent to consider drought conditions of this severity as a distinct possibility.
Th e future of water management in Los Angeles can no longer be based on the supply-
side, government-provided approach favoured in the fi rst half of the 20th century. Th ere 
are no longer any distant frontiers from which needed water resources can be acquired at 
a reasonable cost in a reliable, sustainable manner. Similarly, demand-side initiatives that 
have been the thrust of recent water resource management eff orts, such as water-effi  cient 
fi xtures and government mandated water use reductions, do not hold the solution to 
Los Angeles’ critical water supply issues. Th ey are an essential , but small part of a larger 
vision for water resource management in which the uncertainty surrounding dwindling 
water resources and future demand requires a more radical and comprehensive approach 
that has been dubbed the ‘soft path’. Th is diff ers from other approaches in that it makes 
ecological sustainability a central priority, matches water quality to the needs of the end 
use and adopts long-range planning strategies that go beyond present needs.111 
110 Cook, Edward R., Connie A. Woodhouse, C. Mark Eakin, David M. Meko and David W. Stahle, “Long-Term Aridity 
Changes in the Western United States,” In Science 5 November 2004: Vol. 306 no. 5698, 1015-1018. DOI: 10.1126/
science.1102586, 1015.
111 Brandes, Oliver M. and David B. Brooks, “Th e Soft Path for Water in a Nutshell,” (Victoria, B.C., Friends of the Earth 
Canada and the POLIS Project on Ecological Governance, 2007), 7.
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Th e history of the development of Los Angeles and its problematic relationship with 
water, both in terms of scarcity and excess, is an instructive example of the successes and 
limitations of human endeavours in the modern era. Th e project of modernity—post-
Enlightenment techno-science and industrial capitalism—are built upon the conceptual 
foundations of a reductive, linear rationality that is replicable, scaleable, and in this 
schema, theoretically universal. Th is model has been successful in bending the biosphere to 
human will, enabling an unprecedented level of control over what had been a benefi cent, 
yet capricious and inconsistent nature. Sociologist Jason Moore states “the core of the 
capitalist project, therefore, from its sixteenth-century origins, was the scientifi c and 
symbolic creation of nature in its modern form, as something that could be mapped, 
abstracted, quantifi ed, and otherwise subjected to linear control.”112 Taming the wild to 
serve our needs has been the project of humanity for millennia, but the global scale of 
techno-scientifi c capitalism in the modern era has enabled a prodigious level of control of 
nature, resulting in prosperity for many humans, but inequity and scarcity for others as 
well as a rampant degradation of the biosphere. Th is has been characterized as the mastery 
or domination of nature, which geographer Neil Smith refi nes as the production of nature:
Instead of the domination of nature, therefore, we must consider the much 
more complex process of the production of nature. Where the ‘domination 
of nature’ argument implies a dismal, one-dimensional, contradiction-
free future, the idea of the production of nature implies a historical future 
that is still to be determined by political events and forces, not technical 
necessity. But the political events and forces are precisely those that 
determine the character and structure of the capitalist mode of production.113
Th is distinction between the domination of nature and the production of nature 
is crucial in that it removes the inevitability of disaster and the demonization of 
techno-scientifi c progress from the discourse and enables the critical analysis of 
contemporary global crises and the genealogy of their emergence. Th e concept of the 
centrality of metabolic rifts to capitalism and their role in these crises will be examined. 
112 Jason W. Moore, “Toward a Singular Metabolism: Epistemic Rifts and Environment-Making in the Capitalist World Ecol-
ogy,” In Grounding Metabolism (New Geographies 06), edited by Daniel Ibañez and Nikos Katsikis (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2014), 17.
113 Neil Smith, Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space (New York: Blackwell, 1984), 69.
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2.1 Th e Emergence of Metabolic Rifts
metabolism
Th e chemical processes that occur within a living organism in order to maintain 
life: the metabolism of fatty acids in the kidney. Two kinds of metabolism are often 
distinguished: constructive metabolism, the synthesis of the proteins, carbohydrates, 
and fats which form tissue and store energy, and destructive metabolism, the breakdown 
of complex substances and the consequent production of energy and waste matter.
(Oxford English Dictionary)
rift
A crack, split, or break in something: the wind had torn open a rift in the clouds.
(Oxford English Dictionary)
Metabolism is a term from the natural sciences whose meaning has expanded beyond 
its original disciplinary boundaries to encompass all manner of energy and material 
exchanges between actants within an ecosystem. Th e term ‘metabolism’ emerged in the 
early 19th century to characterize chemical changes within living cells. Its use became 
widespread in biology to describe processes of organic breakdown and recomposition, 
both within organisms and between organisms and their environment. Urban political 
economist David Wachsmuth describes the broader use of the term, which “has lived 
a dual existence in the natural sciences, referring both to processes by which bodies 
change and reproduce themselves and to more holistic conceptions of ecosystem 
relations.”114 In the latter half of the 19th century, this concept was extended to the 
urban sphere, with special emphasis on circulation as a metaphor of productivity, 
health and morality as opposed to stagnation, decay and disease. Matthew Gandy, in 
examining the emergence of large-scale, networked water infrastructure in Paris and 
London, observed that “the nineteenth-century conception of the city as an assemblage 
of identifi able organs placed particular emphasis on the circulatory dynamics of urban 
space.”115 Th is was a response to the socio-environmental degradation caused by rapid 
industrialization and urbanization that was experienced in many European and American 
cities, and felt most keenly in leading-edge cities such as London, Paris and New York. 
‘Circulation’ and ‘fl ow’ emerged as key concepts in addressing the unprecedented and 
overwhelming volumes of sewage—human, animal and industrial—the modern industrial 
city was generating. Th is pollution was rapidly overwhelming cities’ carrying capacities, 
contaminating water supplies and creating hazards to public health. Th us, as Daniel 
114 David Wachsmuth, “Th ree Ecologies: Urban Metabolism and the Society-Nature Opposition,” Th e Sociological Quarterly, 53 
(4) (Sept. 2012): 506. doi: 10.1111/j.1533-8525.2012.01247.x.
115 Matthew Gandy, Th e Fabric of Space: Water, Modernity, and the Urban Imagination (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2014), 10.
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Schneider states, “sewage disposal became one of the most taxing problems facing 
the industrial city”116 Circulation and fl ow were essential concepts, as the transport of 
noxious wastes away from the city as quickly and effi  ciently as possible was essential for 
its continued functioning. However, this massive waste fl ow was routinely dumped into 
the nearest body of water, such as the Th ames River, inaugurating industrial capitalism’s 
modus operandi of offl  oading its wastes downstream, both literally and fi guratively.
Circulation also took on a positive association within the discourse of industrial 
capitalists as a metaphor for the fl ow of investment, money, growth, goods, and most 
importantly, profi t. Th e swift and unencumbered movement of capital and accumulation 
of profi t became conceptually linked with the circulation of cleansing water in urban 
environments. Th e profi table city and the hygienic city became intrinsically linked in 
a dialectic that would inform socio-economic discourse for the next century and a half 
while managing to obscure and marginalize its problematic structural contradictions.
Th e term ‘metabolic rift’ expanded upon Karl Marx’s notion of the “irreparable rift 
in the interdependent process of social metabolism”117 wrought by industrial capitalism, 
which manifested in the expanding division between the worker and the products of 
their labour, between city and country, and between humanity and the rest of nature. 
Th e theory of the metabolic rift draws upon the historical development of the term 
within the natural sciences, as well as how Marx used it to study environmental problems. 
In the middle of the 19th century it was becoming clear that large-scale agricultural 
enterprises, located at increasing distances from the urban areas it fed, was creating 
a problematic imbalance in the transfer of essential nutrients such as nitrogen and 
phosphorous. Sociologists Brett Clark and Richard York summarize this phenomenon: 
“In contrast to traditional agricultural production where essential nutrients were returned 
to the soil, capitalist agriculture transported nutrients essential for replenishing the soil, 
in the form of food and other crops...to urban areas, where they ended up as waste.”118
Th is concept extends Marx’s critique of industrial capitalism into a framework that is 
relevant to contemporary ecological discourses—linking the machinations of capitalism to 
the myriad social and environmental crises that have become disturbingly commonplace. 
A metabolic rift not only entails an ecological rupture, but also a systemic division of 
nature and society. Th e capitalist system subdivides, commoditizes and subsumes both 
116 Daniel Schneider, Hybrid Nature: Sewage Treatment and the Contradictions of the Industrial Ecosystem (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 2011), xx.
117 Karl Marx, Capital: Volume 3: A Critique of Political Economy (London: Penguin Classics, 1993), 949.
118 Brett Clark and Richard York, “Carbon Metabolism: Global Capitalism, Climate Change and the Biospheric Rift,” Th eory and 
Society 34(4) (Aug., 2005): www.jstor.org/stable/4501730, 397-8.
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the human and non-human as resource inputs in the process of capital accumulation. 
“Materials and energy are transformed into new forms.” Clark and York state. “In this 
process, environmental degradation takes place, leading to the accumulation of pollution. 
Lastly, attempts to remedy metabolic rifts, without systematic change to the current 
political-economic system, compound the problems associated with rifts between the social 
metabolism and natural metabolism.”119 Urban theorist Sabine Barles off ers a prescient 
summary of the metabolic processes inherent in techno-scientifi c global capitalism: 
Th e present socio-ecological regime is characterized by the linearization of 
material fl ows—societies taking resources from the biosphere and returning 
waste (i.e., transformed materials often incompatible with the receiving 
area)—and the establishment of biogeochemical cycles. Although the natural 
functioning of the biosphere features substance cycles (carbon, nitrogen, 
etc.), anthropogenic activity not only intensifi es their fl ows but also linearizes 
them, since the materials do not return to their place of origin and therefore 
accumulate in other parts of the biosphere. If the materials somehow return to 
their origin, they do so in a diff erent chemical form. Many of the environmental 
problems encountered today can be attributed to these abundant and linear 
fl ows: resource depletion, climate change, eutrophication, proliferation of solid 
waste, dispersion of toxic material, and loss of biodiversity, just to name a few.120
Contemporary examples of capitalism’s production of metabolic rifts are numerous 
and widespread. Th e global ubiquity of toxic emissions, degraded environments and 
impaired waterbodies indicate that these rifts are symptomatic of the underlying 
structure of neoliberal global capitalism, not just isolated anomalies that can be 
corrected. Massive social inequities between developed and developing countries, as well 
as between privileged and marginalized populations within every country and region, 
demonstrate that the impacts of these rifts are not just environmental, but are social 
as well. Th e defi ning crisis of the early 21st century—anthropogenic climate change—
is the meta-rift of global capitalism—the result of a massive imbalance in carbon 
transfers through the burning of fossil fuels that has enabled global industrialization, 
urbanization and capital accumulation—benefi tting a few countries at the nexus 
of the global capitalist economy, gaining wealth and power “through high fossil fuel 
consumption and exploitation of the global south. Anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
emissions, while stemming from localized sources, are distributed throughout the 
atmosphere and accumulate as waste, which degrades the atmosphere and leads to 
119 Ibid, 400.
120 Sabine Barles. “Urban Metabolism: Persistent Questions and Current Developments.” In Grounding Metabolism (New Geog-
raphies 06), edited by Daniel Ibañez and Nikos Katsikis, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014), 63.
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further alteration of the biosphere, creating a global crisis,”121 observes Clark and York.
Th e production of nature at the core of capitalism is inherently fl awed by a 
dissonance between desired results and unintended outcomes in which unintended 
outcomes are offl  oaded to the public realm. Geographer David Harvey states that:
Capital has long preferred to treat the costs of social reproduction as an externality—a 
cost for which it bears no market responsibility—but the social-democratic 
movement and the active threat of a communist alternative forced capital to 
internalize some of those costs, along with some of the externality costs attributable 
to environmental degradation, up until the 1970’s in the advanced capitalist world. 
Th e aim of neoliberal policies since 1980 or so has been to dump these costs into 
the global commons of social reproduction and the environment, creating, as it 
were, a negative commons in which whole populations are forced now to dwell.122
Th ese metabolic rifts in the ecology of capitalism are ubiquitous and critical. It is important 
to examine whether they are merely anomalies or structurally intrinsic to capitalism.
2.2 Structural Contradictions of Capitalism
David Harvey, in Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism (2014), examines 
the internal contradictions within capitalism and their role in the emergence of 
contemporary global crises. He contends that these contradictions have made capitalism 
fl exible and resilient, but contain the seeds of systemic catastrophe. While many of the 
contradictions are manageable, others are potentially disastrous: the stress on endless 
compound growth, the necessity to exploit nature to its limits, and its tendency toward 
universal alienation. Another curious, yet signifi cant contradiction of capitalism lies 
in the disjunction between the theoretical effi  cacy of the market and the problem 
of market externalities. Harvey raises the question of “the pervasive problem of 
what to do about market failures. Th ese arise because of so-called externality eff ects, 
defi ned as real costs which are not (for some reason) registered in the market. Th e 
most obvious fi eld of externalities is pollution, where fi rms and individuals do not 
pay for deleterious eff ects on air, water and land qualities through their actions.”123
Another critical contradiction of capitalism is the distinction between “use value” and 
“exchange value”. Th ese concepts were introduced by Marx124 and further elaborated by 
Harvey. “Use value” refers to the practical aspects of a commodity, service or product, such 
121 Brett Clark and Richard York, “Carbon Metabolism: Global Capitalism, Climate Change and the Biospheric Rift,” Th eory and 
Society 34(4) (Aug., 2005): www.jstor.org/stable/4501730, 414-5.
122 David Harvey. Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution (New York: Verso, 2012), 85.
123 David Harvey, Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 43.
124 Marx, ibid.
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as a house or wheat. Th is is the root of the fundamental justifi cation of capitalism—that 
human needs are most eff ectively met by the rational and self-optimizing processes of the 
market. However, the intersection of surplus capital and the market prioritizes the exchange 
value of that commodity, service or product above its use value. Tradable currency is a fetish 
for the value produced by the production of nature, both human and non-human. Maria 
Kaika extends this basic Marxist tenet into contemporary discourses in political ecology:
Blurring the socio-environmental process of their production by grounding their 
character as universally exchangeable for anything else is an amazingly powerful 
ideological mechanism. Severing materially and symbolically the connection 
between producing exchange and use values contributes to masking the qualitative 
social and environmental relations of production. Acquiring exchange value, 
without revealing at the same time social power relations of their production, 
permits commodities to be presented as exceptional, as outside and over the 
thing that really makes them exceptional, i.e., the social metabolism of nature.125 
Th is is extends the concept of the metabolic rift into cultural discourse, exemplifying a 
fundamental disjunction between our collective imaginings and our material practices.
A foundational contradiction of capitalism is the concept of ‘primitive accumulation’, 
a term coined by Marx to describe the origins of capital in the era of colonialism. If abundant 
natural resources are found and are not being exploited, there is a fundamental justifi cation 
for the violent appropriation of these resources under the law of private property.
Private property establishes an exclusive ownership right to a thing or a process 
whether it is being actively used or not. At the root of commodity exchange there 
lies the presupposition that I do not myself actively want or need the commodity 
I off er for trade. Indeed, the very defi nition of a commodity is something that is 
produced for someone else to use. Private property rights confer the right to trade 
away (alienate) that which is owned. A diff erence then emerges between what 
are called usufructuary rights (rights that pertain to active use) and exclusionary 
permanent ownership rights. Th is diff erence has often been the source of confusion, 
particularly throughout the history of colonialism. Indigenous populations 
frequently operate on the basis of usufructuary rights to land, for example (this is 
the case with shifting agriculture). Colonial powers typically imposed exclusionary 
ownership rights and this was the source of a great deal of confl ict. Populations 
that moved around from one site to another, following their herds or moving 
from exhausted land to fresh and more fertile land, suddenly found themselves 
barred from moving by the existence of fences and barbed wire. Th ey often 
found themselves prevented from using land that they had traditionally regarded 
as open for use because someone now owned it in perpetuity even if it was not 
used. Th e indigenous population in North America suff ered greatly from this.126
Th e foundational projects of capitalism have been demonstrated to be violent, 
125 Maria Kaika, City of Flows: Modernity, Nature, and the City (New York: Routledge, 2005), 31.
126 David Harvey, Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 46.
55
practically criminal enterprises, operating under a banner of the freedom and 
progress represented by private property rights. Th is is the essence of ‘primitive 
accumulation’ as the genesis of industrial capitalism. Th e processes of primitive 
accumulation continue to this day as countries and territories are subsumed by 
investment fl ows operating within the global network of neoliberal capitalist regimes.
Sociologist Saskia Sassen characterizes the devastating eff ects of global neoliberal 
capitalism as ‘expulsions’, a vacating of both the human and the non-human from life-
spaces as these territories are mined, both literally and fi guratively, as capital fl ows in, 
expands and departs. In the socio-economic sphere we are witnessing “a formidable 
problem in our global political economy: the emergence of new logics of expulsion. 
Th e past two decades have seen a sharp growth in the number of people, enterprises, 
and places expelled from the core social and economic orders of our time.”127
It is clear that capitalism, in the course of its daily operations, creates metabolic 
rifts throughout all of the territory it occupies. Th ese rifts are environmental, 
social, and economic, calling into question the entire structure of capitalism and its 
foundational theories. Th e conceptual fi ssures of neoliberal global capitalism and 
their spatial implications will be examined in the next chapter, Uneven Development.
127 Saskia Sassen, Expulsions: Brutality and Complexity in the Global Economy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2015), 8.

 3.0     U N E V E N  D E V E L O P M E N T
Contemporary urban space is characterised by landscapes of neglect 
interspersed with intense foci of capital accumulation and elite consumption.128
Matthew Gandy
Capital creates a geographical landscape that meets its needs at one point in time 
only to have to destroy it at a later point in time to facilitate capital’s further 
expansion and qualitative transformation. Capital unleashes the powers of ‘creative 
destruction’ upon the land. Some factions benefi t from the creativity, while others 
suff er the brunt of the destruction. Invariably, this involves a class disparity.129
David Harvey
In the previous chapter, the tendency of capitalism to produce metabolic rifts was 
discussed—the term ‘uneven development’ describes the processes through which 
these rifts are manifested spatially. Economist Donald J. Harris states that “one of the 
most striking characteristics of the general process of capitalist development is the 
phenomenon of uneven development, defi ned as persistent diff erences in levels and 
rates of economic development between diff erent sectors of the economy.”130 Th is 
defi nition, in situating the locus of uneven development between diff erent economic 
sectors, is much narrower in scale than the pervasive global ubiquity of uneven 
development, but is a good place to begin tracing this phenomenon. To make profi ts 
and accumulate capital, companies seek to increase revenue and decrease costs, with 
growth as the primary goal: “the outcome of a process which is driven by active agents, 
not by exogenous factors. In particular, in the context of the capitalist economy, 
growth is the outcome of the self-directed and self-organizing activity of fi rms, each 
seeking to expand and to improve its competitive position in relation to the rest.”131 
Th is incessant drive for growth and capital accumulation requires constant innovation 
and the expansion of territories at expanding spatial and temporal scales. Th is creates 
an aggregation of eff ects as the assemblages of economic actors expand their activities 
and infl uence into every corner of the world, rendering their structural diff erentiations 
globally spatialized. Th e problems of the fi rm become the problems of the world.
128 Matthew Gandy, “Urban Flux,” Architectural Design 79. (Sept. 2009): 12-17. doi: 10.1002/ad.943, 15.
129 David Harvey, Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 135.
130 Donald J. Harris, “Uneven Development,” Th e New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition,. Steven N. Durlauf and 
Lawrence E. Blume, editors, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008)
131 Ibid.
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An instructive example of this phenomenon began in the 1970’s in a transfer 
of a wide range of industrial activities from the United States to Asia, where weaker 
environmental regulations and substantially lower wage rates off ered a signifi cantly 
preferential environment for capital accumulation. Th is resulted in widespread socio-
economic devastation in the formerly prosperous industrial regions of the north-east 
United States and rapid economic development combined with rampant ecological 
degradation in many regions of China and other newly industrializing countries in Asia.
Uneven development, while being a central aspect of the production of space 
under capitalism, does have some roots in the extant predispositions of human 
socio-economic activity. Certain natural conditions favour certain types of economic 
development—coastal regions specializing in fi shing and shipping ports, for example. 
At the local urban scale, the phenomenon of ‘hills and valleys’, in which elites live on 
the hills and everybody else lives in the valleys, has been a consistent distribution of 
urban space since the dawn of recorded history. Th e industrial revolution inaugurated 
the privileging of the west side of a city over the east side, as prevailing winds moved 
the noxious fumes produced by industrial activity eastward. Th e distinction inherent 
in global industrial capitalism, however, is one of scale and systematic distribution—
both spatially and temporally. Economic activity can shift to regions thousands of 
kilometers away in relatively short time spans, rendering entire regions functionally 
dead or booming, irrespective of natural conditions. Th is phenomenon refl ects what 
Harvey refers to as the “spatial fi x”132 of capitalism which overcomes localized crises 
of under- or over-accumulation by continually shifting capital across global networks. 
“Capital fl ows from time to time get redirected from one space to another. Th e 
capitalist system remains relatively stable as a whole, even though the parts experience 
periodic diffi  culties...Capital never has to address its systemic failings because it 
moves them around geographically.”133 Capitalism can extract value from populations 
and ecosystems to the point of exhaustion and diminishing returns, pick up its 
stakes, and mobilize the accumulated capital to new territories ripe for exploitation. 
3.1 Uneven development in the emergence of the USA
While uneven development is a globally ubiquitous, integral aspect of capitalism, the 
manner in which it manifests is highly individualized, expressing extant socio-economic 
conditions and cultural tendencies within the territories of capital accumulation. Negative 
132 David Harvey, “Globalization and the spatial fi x,” Geographische revue 2, no. 3 (2001): 23-31.
133 Ibid., Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 151.
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aspects of uneven development occur where populations and/or ecologies are deemed 
exploitable, disposable, or any other variation of concepts of ‘the other’. Defenders of 
capitalism would suggest that this phenomenon is the result of human prejudices and 
that the ideal mechanisms of the market, if left unfettered, would deliver benefi ts to all. 
However, surplus value does not create itself, and must be produced through the exploitation 
of something—whether it is a natural ecology, a human population, or some combination 
of both. An abstract, ideal ‘market’ has never existed that has not been defi ned and 
delineated by human practices. In fact, these practices have often acted as limiting factors, 
through laws and regulations that have restrained the most destructive drives of capital 
accumulation. Alternatively, socio-cultural predispositions have been the mechanism by 
which the precarity, degradation and exploitation engendered by capitalism is assigned.
Th e United States grew from a sparsely populated British colony to a dominant 
world power through violent processes of primitive accumulation—seizing land and 
resources from Native American peoples and appropriating the bodies of slaves and 
their labours to build out a burgeoning frontier economy. While this process is similar 
to economic growth through acts of war practiced by humans for millennia, it is a 
precursor to the phenomenon David Harvey calls “accumulation by dispossession”134. 
Harvey’s term refers to contemporary practices of neoliberalism such as privatization 
and fi nancialization in which governments and their attendant powers are co-opted to 
facilitate capital accumulation by dispossessing public resources and dismantling the 
foundations of the social contracts upon which nations are built. Its similarity to the 
aforementioned historical practices is in the ideological and legal dimension, in which 
acts of war, violence, and exclusion are legitimized through supposedly higher-order 
concepts such as ‘freedom’, the ‘will of God’, ‘the invisible hand of the market”, ‘illegal 
immigrant’, ‘eminent domain’, ‘highest and best use’, ‘savages’, ‘inferior races’, etcetera.
3.2 Th e Geography of Exclusion
Private property rights, a linchpin of post-Enlightenment humanist values upon which 
the United States was founded, was inaugurated through the systematic dispossession of 
indigenous lands and the bodies of the slave population. From these morally questionable 
beginnings, however, this foundational ethos enabled unprecedented levels of prosperity 
and security for many working-class Americans through home ownership. Th e percentage 
of the population who lived in owner-occupied dwellings rose from 46.5 percent in 
134 Ibid., “Th e “New” Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession,” Socialist Register 40, 63-87.
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Fig. 3.01 USA and California—historical home ownership rates (1900-2010)
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1900 to a peak of 66.2 percent in 2000.135 California lagged behind the US average 
throughout this time, beginning roughly the same—46.3 percent in 1900, but peaking 
at 58.4 percent in 1960. (see Figure 3.01) In 2014, the US average was 64.5 percent 
while 54.2 percent of California’s population lived in owner-occupied dwellings.136
While individual home ownership was a foundational component of the 20th 
century American project of expansive prosperity, the extent to which this has been 
achieved is far from universal. In comparing the most recent statistics on home 
ownership rates, the US ranks 38th in the world, lagging behind countries such as 
Romania (96.1 percent)137, Singapore (90.3 percent)138, Norway (84.4 percent)139 
and Mexico (80 percent)140.  Even the correlation between home ownership rates 
and economic health and prosperity is called into question as countries with 
severe economic crises such as Spain (78.8 percent) and Greece (74.0 percent) rank 
135 United States Census Bureau, “Historical Census of Housing Tables,” Last updated October 31, 2011, http://www.census.
gov/hhes/www/housing/census/historic/owner.html.
136 United States Census Bureau, “Housing Vacancies and Homeownership (CPS/HVS): Annual Statistics: 2014 (Including 
Historical Data by State and MSA),” Last updated February 21, 2014, http://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/data/ann14ind.html.
137 Eurostat, “Distribution of population by tenure status, type of household and income group,” Last modifi ed November 17, 
2015, http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do.
138 Singapore Statistics, “Home Ownership Rate of Resident Households,” Last updated February 16, 2015, http://www.singstat.
gov.sg/statistics/visualising-data/charts/home-ownership-rate-of-resident-households.
139 Eurostat, Ibid.
140 Marco A. López-Silva, Raúl Abreu-Lastra, Alberto Saracho-Martínez, Agustín Paulín-Hutmacher, “Housing Finance in 
Mexico: Current State and Future Sustainability,” Inter-American Development Bank, (November, 2011), 9, Accessed November 
4, 2015, https://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/5353.
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ahead of the US in this key economic indicator, while a country with a relatively 
healthy economy, Germany (52.5 percent), is near the bottom of this list.141
Single-family home ownership, the cornerstone of the ‘American Dream’, 
has been a gate to security and prosperity, but access to this space has been 
systematically denied to people of colour and people of ‘foreign’ cultures.
3.2.1 Racially Restrictive Covenants
Residential segregation was a historically common and widespread phenomenon in the 
United States. Th is was not merely a result of disparity in housing location and quality due 
to diff erences in the income levels of various socio-economic groups and the tendency for 
these groups to cluster together in close-knit communities, but was an intrinsic disposition 
of both private industry and state and local governments. In the early 20th century racial 
segregation was mandated by municipal zoning ordinances that were upheld by many state 
governments until a 1917 Supreme Court ruling, Buchanan v. Warley, which declared 
municipally mandated racial zoning unconstitutional.142 Th is decision did not, however, 
end the practice of residential segregation, as the emergence of racially restrictive covenants 
continued this systematic exclusion of African-Americans from most housing markets.
A covenant is a legally enforceable contract contained in the deed to a property, 
is attached to said property in perpetuity, and is legally enforceable on future buyers 
of the property. Owners who violate the terms of the covenant risk forfeiting the 
property. Racially restrictive covenants refer to contractual agreements that prohibit 
the purchase, lease, or occupation of a property by a particular group of people, 
usually African Americans. Racially restrictive covenants operated at a variety of scales; 
from mutual agreements between property owners in a particular neighbourhood 
to part of a wider set of practices enforced through the cooperation of real estate 
boards and neighbourhood associations.  A typical covenant included the following:
hereafter no part of said property or any portion thereof shall be…occupied by 
any person not of the Caucasian race, it being intended hereby to restrict the use 
of said property…against occupancy as owners or tenants of any portion of said 
property for resident or other purposes by people of the Negro or Mongolian race.143
Th e widespread practice of using racial covenants became so socially 
141 Eurostat, Ibid.
142 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, “Understanding Fair Housing,” Publication 42, February 1973, 4.
143 Ibid.
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acceptable that “in 1937 a leading magazine of nationwide circulation awarded 
10 communities a ‘shield of honor’ for an umbrella of restrictions against the 
‘wrong kind of people’.”144  Th is practice was so commonplace that by 1940, 80% 
of property in Los Angeles carried restrictive covenants barring black families.145
It is at this point, again, where a defender of capitalism would point to human 
prejudice, not the machinations of the free market, as the locus of this injustice. 
Th is characterization is partially true, but the fact that the provision of housing is a 
commoditized, capital-intensive and profi t-driven enterprise renders racial inclusion/
exclusion, through its perceived infl uence on property values, an integral component 
of the real estate market. Th is realization is refl ected, as recently as 1950, in the 
National Association of Real Estate Brokers’ (NAREB) code of ethics, which stated:
Th e realtor should not be instrumental in introducing into a neighborhood a character 
of property or occupancy, members of any race or nationality or any individual 
whose presence will clearly be detrimental to property values in the neighborhood.146
Th is marks the early stages of a process of uneven development in the urban fabric 
of Los Angeles in which unequal housing conditions are not only the result of an 
inequitable distribution of economic opportunity, but become what Aldo Rossi termed 
a “pathological permanence”147. Th is is a concrete manifestation of the social relations 
inherent in this inequity that congeal into urban artefacts that continue to exert their 
own agency in an ongoing socio-spatial dialectic. In simpler terms, the inequity creates 
the slums, and the slums continue to create inequity. Th is is a common and ubiquitous 
phenomenon among cities around the world under capitalism, but Los Angeles manifests 
it in a way particular to its particular history, culture, landscape and topography.
3.2.2 Redlining
In 1933, Congress created the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC), a New Deal 
initiative championed by President Franklin Roosevelt to help stem the urban foreclosure 
crisis during the Great Depression. Over the next three years, the federal agency refi nanced 
more than a million homes. It issued low-interest, long-term loans to new homeowners 
across the nation, spurring a dramatic increase in home-ownership rates over the following 
144  Ibid.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid., 3.
147 Aldo Rossi, Th e Architecture of the City, translated by Diane Ghirardo and Joan Ockman, (Cambridge, Mass.: Th e M.I.T. 
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decades. In 1934, as a companion initiative to the HOLC, Congress created the Federal 
Housing Administration. Th e FHA insured private mortgages, causing a drop in interest 
rates and reducing the size of the down payment required to buy a house. Th is was 
another major New Deal initiative aimed at reducing the economic inequities ravaging 
the USA during the Great Depression, and bringing the vast ranks of the unemployed 
and destitute back into the fold of the American economy. Th ese large-scale initiatives 
of re-inclusion into American economic life, however, had a glaring mechanism 
of exclusion at its core—racially-based ‘redlining’, a practice summarized below:
Th e FHA had adopted a system of maps that rated neighborhoods according 
to their perceived stability. On the maps, green areas, rated ‘A,’ indicated ‘in 
demand’ neighborhoods that, as one appraiser put it, lacked ‘a single foreigner or 
Negro.’ Th ese neighborhoods were considered excellent prospects for insurance. 
Neighborhoods where black people lived were rated ‘D’ and were usually 
considered ineligible for FHA backing. Th ey were colored in red. Neither the 
percentage of black people living there nor their social class mattered. Black 
people were viewed as a contagion. Redlining went beyond FHA-backed loans 
and spread to the entire mortgage industry, which was already rife with racism, 
excluding black people from most legitimate means of obtaining a mortgage.148
Th ere were two other categories in the FHA underwriting maps, ‘B’, or blue 
areas, which denoted neighbourhoods that were still desirable, but had reached their 
peak and were expected to remain stable for many years to come. ‘C’, or yellow 
areas, that were in decline. Th ese areas were typically bordered by ‘D’, or redlined 
neighbourhoods with substantial black and/or low income populations (see Figure 
3.02). An interesting subtext in these neighbourhood classifi cations is the spatio-
temporal aspect, in which any rating below an ‘A’ refl ects an assessment of the 
process of decline as development moves outward from central cities and inner-ring 
suburbs. Th is suggests an institutional tendency towards privileging new development 
and expanding suburbanization over the care for and maintenance of existing 
neighbourhoods and housing stock. While there was still a plenitude of undeveloped 
land to colonize, there was little incentive to prioritize existing areas of the city other 
than well-established business districts and affl  uent residential neighbourhoods.
Th ese racially-based exclusionary tendencies are not a post-facto analysis of 
subtle institutional inclinations, but are an overt system of practices codifi ed 
148 Ta-Nehisi Coates, “Th e Case for Reparations,” Th e Atlantic, June 2014, Accessed November 4, 2015, http://www.theatlantic.
com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631/.
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Fig. 3.02 Los Angeles and vicinity—residential security map (1936)
in the institution’s own documents. A section of the FHA’s underwriting 
guidelines confl ates noxious environmental conditions with race and nationality:
Protection against adverse infl uences is obtained by the existence and enforcement 
of proper zoning regulations and appropriate deed restrictions. Important 
among adverse influences are the following: infiltration of inharmonious 
racial or nationality groups; the presence of smoke, odors, fog, etc.149
Th e systematic exclusion of African-American people from the US’s 20th 
century home ownership boom was nearly absolute. According to the 1940 
Housing Census, fewer than 25,000 of more than one million homes refi nanced 
by HOLC were owned by people of non-white ethnicities. Th is left an enduring 
pattern of disinvestment and decline on the urban fabric of Los Angeles:
149 “Underwriting Manual: Underwriting and Valuation Procedure Under Title II of the National Housing Act,” U.S. Federal 
Housing Administration, Rev. April 1, 1936. Part II-Risk Rating Instructions, paragraphs 309, 310.
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Locked out of the greatest mass-based opportunity for wealth accumulation 
in American history, African Americans who desired and were able to aff ord 
home ownership found themselves consigned to central-city communities 
where their investments were affected by the ‘self-fulfilling prophecies’ 
of the FHA appraisers: cut off from sources of new investment, their 
homes and communities deteriorated and lost value in comparison to 
those homes and communities that FHA appraisers deemed desirable.”150 
In the dominant development model of outward expansion to increasingly 
distant suburban areas, existing neighbourhoods inexorably declined as housing 
stock decayed and housing styles went out of fashion. Property values declined and 
these neighbourhoods underwent signifi cant demographic changes as lower income 
groups and marginalized ethnic groups such as African-Americans shut out from 
other housing opportunities moved in. Th is phenomenon has been widely dubbed 
‘white fl ight’, but this term is problematic in that it suggests that the dominant white 
population were fl eeing a dangerous, disempowering situation. It is more accurate 
to characterize the process of American suburbanization as a complex assemblage 
of factors that included increased mobility enabled by advances in transportation 
technology and infrastructure such as commuter trains and the automobile, cheaper 
land prices and the subsidization of new infrastructure by existing central cities that 
drove development outward from the city. It is more a movement towards a perceived 
utopia than an escape from a perceived dystopia. Th us, the process of suburbanization 
is not a diaspora, but a pilgrimage, and only the chosen were welcome on the journey.
3.2.3 Th e Subprime Mortgage Crisis
Th e global economic crisis of 2008 was predominantly driven by the collapse of a ‘house 
of cards’ of complex speculative fi nancial instruments based, in theory, on the fi nancing of 
integral sectors of the global economy. In reality, global fi nancial markets created convoluted 
chains of fi nancial instruments that are only conceptually connected to actual economic 
activity. Saskia Sassen summarizes this reckless and increasingly hegemonic practice well:
Finance needs to be distinguished from traditional banking. Traditional banks 
sell money in their possession. Financial fi rms sell something they do not have, 
and therein lies the push to be far more innovative and invasive than traditional 
banking. In this regard fi nance can be thought of as a capability to securitize 
150 Melvin L. Oliver and Th omas M. Shapiro, Black Wealth/White Wealth in “Th e Case for Reparations,” Th e Atlantic, June 
2014, Ta-Nehisi Coates,  Accessed November 4, 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-repa-
rations/361631/.
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Fig. 3.03 Los Angeles—distribution of subprime mortgages (2007)
just about everything in an economy and, in doing so, subject economies and 
governments to its own criteria for measuring success. Securitization involves the 
relocation of a building, good, or debt, into a fi nancial circuit where it becomes 
mobile and can be bought and sold over and over in markets near and far. In 
the past two decades fi nance has invented often very complex instruments to 
securitize extreme instances of familiar items—not just high-grade debt but 
also used-car loans and modest municipal government debt. Once an input is 
securitized, fi nancial engineering can keep on building long chains of increasingly 
speculative instruments that all rest on the alleged stability of that fi rst step. 
This is, then, a very special, distinctive, and often dangerous capability.151
Th e cornerstone of this practice that resulted in cascading failures in the USA 
and the rest of the world was the subprime mortgage, an alternative to mainstream 
(or ‘prime’) mortgage products that were typically off ered to borrowers with low 
credit ratings, usually 600 or below. Th ese mortgages also required minimal, if any, 
151 Saskia Sassen, Expulsions: Brutality and Complexity in the Global Economy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2015), 26.
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down payments. Th e higher default risk associated with subprime mortgages resulted 
in very high interest rates. A common type of subprime mortgages was an adjustable 
rate mortgage (ARM), a 30-year mortgage that charged a low rate for the fi rst two 
or three years, then reset at a rate based on the currently prevailing benchmark rate 
like the London Interbank Off ered Rate (LIBOR). Th is reset rate was often higher 
than the initial rate, causing additional diffi  culty for some borrowers, who frequently 
found themselves unable to aff ord the new higher rate, and ended up defaulting 
on the mortgage. Th is is one of the factors that lead to the subprime crisis in 2008.
 Th ese fi nancial instruments were constructed in a manner that paid handsome 
dividends to the issuing institutions and their loan offi  cers upon closing the deal, 
regardless of whether or not this loan was paid off . Th is was a volume sale enterprise—the 
amount to be made from each transaction wasn’t particularly substantial, but the ease and 
speed with which these deals could be extended to all made it like a ‘Black Friday’ sale.
Subprime mortgages were disproportionately targeted towards low-
income and minority populations that had been traditionally excluded from 
access to mainstream banking resources, so it is not surprising that there 
was an outpouring of demand for these fi nancial products (see Figure 3.03).
In 2006, the percentage of black borrowers that received a subprime loan was three 
times higher than for white borrowers, and the percentage for Hispanic borrowers 
was two and half times higher than for white borrowers. In 2007, the percentage 
of black borrowers that obtained subprime loans was seven times that for white 
borrowers.152 It has been argued that this was not a discriminatory practice of the 
banking industry, but simply a function of the lower income and credit worthiness 
of subprime borrowers, which tended to be unequally skewed towards minority 
populations. Th ere is some merit to this assertion, but a substantial percentage of 
subprime loans were made to borrowers who could have qualifi ed for lower-cost prime 
loans. “More than 1 in 5 Black and Hispanic borrowers with FICO scores above 720 
received a higher priced loan, compared to 1 in 20 white and Asian borrowers.”153
Th e subprime mortgage crisis resulted in economic devastation at all scales—from the 
152 Gould Ellen, Ingrid and Josiah Madar, “Th e High Cost of Segregation: Exploring the Relationship Between Racial Segrega-
tion and Subprime Lending,” Furman Center for Real Estate & Urban Policy, New York University, Policy Brief, November 2009, 
http://furmancenter.org/research/publications/eyJyZXN1bHRfcGFnZSI6InJlc2VhcmNoXC9wdWJsaWNhdGlvbnMiLCJjYX-
RlZ29yeTphcmVhIjoiNjgiLCJ5ZWFyIjoiMjAwOSIsIm9yZGVyYnlfc29ydCI6Imxvd19zZWFyY2hfc2NvcmV8ZGVzYyIsIn-
giOiIyMCIsInkiOiIxMSJ9.
153 Carolina Reid and Elizabeth Laderman, “Th e Untold Costs of Subprime Lending: Examining the Links among Higher-Priced 
Lending, Foreclosures and Race in California,” Paper presented at “Challenges and Opportunities for Homeownership in a 
Changing Financial Environment,” sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco in cooperation with Th e Greenlining 
Institute, May 6, 2009, Accessed November 5, 2015, https://www.academia.edu/7673135.
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Fig. 3.04 Los Angeles-distribution of subprime mortgage foreclosures (2007)
global to the local. Globally, the perpetrators of this crisis prospered while the public realm 
was left to bear the costs. Government bailouts and IMF-sanctioned austerity measures 
registered the costs of this catastrophic failure to the public realm while many in the 
banking and fi nancial industries walked away from this disaster substantially wealthier.
On a local scale, entire neighbourhoods experienced signifi cant devaluations to their 
hard-earned property values. In Los Angeles, areas that were traditionally low income 
with low property values were driven even further down. Not surprisingly, these areas 
were the same neighbourhoods abandoned by the HOLC and FHA (see Figure 3.04). 
Foreclosures were rampant, resulting in substantial portions of neighbourhoods sitting 
vacant, awaiting occupancy, while other areas of the city recovered from the subprime 
mortgage crisis and were undergoing robust growth in development and property values.
Research shows that subprime loans are more likely to result in foreclosure, even 
when individual borrower characteristics and other factors that infl uence the 
probability of foreclosure are taken into account. If black and Hispanic borrowers 
are more likely than white borrowers to receive such loans, then blacks and 
68
Los Angeles
Distribution of  Subprime Mortgage Foreclosures
Compton
Hispanics will disproportionately suff er the consequences of foreclosures. Black 
and Hispanic families will be more likely than white families to lose the savings 
they put into the down payment or into maintenance and improvements, to be 
displaced from their homes and neighbourhoods, and to suff er damaged credit 
ratings and other consequences of foreclosure. Neighbourhoods with higher 
percentages of black and Hispanic residents will be disproportionately likely to 
suff er vacant and abandoned properties, as well as increases in crime and decreases 
in property values, which have been found to result from foreclosure activity.154
It is a foundational problem when substantial economic gain can be extracted from 
economic devastation. Greed, unethical and criminal practices in the banking and 
fi nance industry, combined with the global reach and enormous infl uence of this sector 
have created a profoundly unjust and unsustainable distribution of power. We cannot 
continue to treat extreme global fi nancialization as a legitimate economic system. It 
is violence by algorithm in which profi ts are privatized and losses are socialized. 
3.3 Spatial Distribution of Environmental Vulnerability
Vulnerability to environmental hazards and stressors tends to be unevenly distributed, 
with lower income and marginalized populations bearing a disproportionate 
proportion of the risk. Los Angeles is no exception to this phenomenon. A branch of 
the California Environmental Protection Agency, the Offi  ce of Environmental Health 
Hazard Assessment, is devoted to the study of environmental health hazards and the 
“health risks posed by environmental contaminants. OEHHA’s mission is to protect 
human health and the environment through scientifi c evaluation of risks posed by 
hazardous substances.”155 Th e OEHHA completed a state-wide study of a variety of 
environmental health hazards at the census tract level and created CalEnviroScreen, 
a GIS-based “screening methodology that can be used to identify California 
communities that are disproportionately burdened by multiple sources of pollution.”156 
CalEnviroScreen profi les multiple indicators that, when aggregated, constitute an 
overall Pollution Burden. Th ese indicators are:
-Air quality: ozone
-Air quality: PM 2.5 (fi ne particulate matter pollution)
-Diesel particulate matter
154 Gould and Madar, Ibid.
155 Offi  ce of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment, “OEHHA Department Description”, Accessed March 18, 2015, http://
oehha.ca.gov/about/description.html.
156 Offi  ce of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment, “CalEnviroScreen 2.0”, Last updated November 12, 2014, http://oehha.
ca.gov/ej/ces2.html.
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-Drinking water contamination
-Pesticide use
-Toxic release from facilities
-Traffi  c density
-Cleanup sites
-Groundwater threats
-Hazardous waste generators and facilities
-Impaired waterbodies
-Solid waste sites and facilities
Secondly, CalEnviroScreen profi les population characteristics that could result
in a higher vulnerability to environmental health hazards; Sensitive Population and 
Socioeconomic Factor indicators. Th ese are:
Sensitive Population
-Age: children and elderly
-Asthma
-Low birth weight infants
Socioeconomic Factor Indicators
-Educational attainment
-Linguistic isolation
-Poverty
-Unemployment
Th ese socio-environmental vulnerabilities are explored here through a
series of maps created from CalEnviroScreen raw GIS data, separating Los 
Angeles County from the state-wide data, profi ling each of these indicators, 
aggregating them and drawing comparisons to median income, median 
home values, and population density by census tract (see Figures 3.05-3.19).
Vulnerability to environmental health hazards are shown to be correlated 
to income, with low- to middle-income census tracts exposed the highest 
levels of environmental hazards, with medium/high- to high-income census 
tracts experiencing very little exposure to environmental health hazards.
Th e locus of these environmental hazards and the population characteristics that bear 
a disproportionate sensitivity to them is in the region of Los Angeles known as ‘South 
Central’; the area in the middle of the county in the fl oodplain of the Los Angeles River that 
has been the home to many of Los Angeles’ African-American and Hispanic communities.
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Fig. 3.05 California EnviroScreen—Los Angeles County-exposure indicators (by percentile)
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Fig. 3.06 California EnviroScreen—Los Angeles County-environmental effects indicators (by percentile)
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Fig. 3.07 California EnviroScreen-Los Angeles County—sensitive population indicators (by percentile)
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Fig. 3.08 California EnviroScreen-Los Angeles County—socioeconomic factor indicators (by percentile)
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Fig. 3.09 California EnviroScreen-Los Angeles County—aggregate indicators (by percentile)
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Fig. 3.10 Los Angeles County—median household income by census tract (2014)
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Fig. 3.11 Los Angeles County—median home value by census tract (2014)
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Fig. 3.12 Los Angeles County—population density by census tract (2014)
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Fig. 3.13 California EnviroScreen-Los Angeles County—environmental vulnerability by household income (2014)
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3.4 Parks and Public Space in LA County: Scarcity and Uneven Access
Los Angeles operates in an enthralling and problematic relationship with its environment. 
It has always sold itself as a bucolic land of opportunity, good climate, and picturesque 
landscapes. “Imagining Los Angeles has been, to a greater extent than with other U.S. and 
European cities,” states William McClung, “a process of aligning a model of a hoped-for 
Utopian future with one of an allegedly Arcadian past that cries out to be redeemed.”157 
Arcadia is defi ned as “an image or idea of life in the countryside that is believed 
to be perfect.”158 Th is notion has been instrumental in driving suburban and exurban 
development since the days of the Roman Empire. Th e country villas of the Roman 
elites were a place to escape the rigours of the city to enjoy a leisure-oriented experience 
of a tamed and constructed nature. In this conception of the rural landscape, the 
productivity of agricultural activities is vacated, replaced with a cosmopolitan, urban 
hedonism. Th is conception of nature/culture and city/not-city has persisted through 
time and became a central tenet of suburban expansion from the 19th century onwards. 
Th is Arcadian origin myth has proven to be a robust and productive development 
mythology for Los Angeles, supported by utopian projects of massive public 
infrastructure initiatives. Th is has engendered a rampant development centred 
upon suburban detached single-family dwellings in a vast, expanding network of 
homogenous, monocultural, auto-dependent urbanisms that rely both on the myth 
of Los Angeles’ Arcadia and the constructed domestication of nature through massive, 
publicly funded utopian infrastructural projects like aqueducts, dams and sewage 
treatment plants. Th is dialectic constructs a potentially infi nite fi eld based upon the 
replication of the basic unit of the urban fabric of Los Angeles—the detached, single-
family home. Civic identity and built form here does not stem from the collective 
body politic of a discrete city, but from an aggregation of individuals whose allegiance 
is owed primarily to themselves and their family unit. Maria Kaika characterizes this 
idea as foundational to Western notions of freedom: “Individual freedom became the 
sacred principle of the modernizing Western world, and the individualized space of the 
private house became its sacred space. Th rough this social process, the house (a material 
construction, an edifi ce) was turned into the home (a place imbued with cultural and 
ideological meaning).”159 Th e locus of the urban environment in Los Angeles is neither 
157 William A. McClung, Landscapes of Desire: Anglo Mythologies of Los Angeles (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000,) 
13.
158 Cambridge Dictionary Online, “Arcadia,” http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/arcadia.
159 Maria Kaika, City of Flows: Modernity, Nature, and the City (New York: Routledge, 2005), 52.
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Fig. 3.14 Los Angeles County—parks and recreation areas
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Fig. 3.15 Los Angeles County—transportation networks and park accessibility
a civic square nor an ensemble of iconic historic edifi ces, but the generically symbolic 
detached, single-family home with a lawn and a car in the driveway. Here we fi nd 
“the characteristic L.A. promise that in buying a part, one will buy into the whole—a 
promise often heard from communities that are selling the intangibles of climate and 
other ‘found’ amenities.”160 Th is suburban model of the built environment is not unique 
160 McClung, Ibid., 33-4.
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to Los Angeles, but it is here that this phenomenon is the most pervasive and acute.
Th e Arcadia engendered by the natural beauty and landscape amenities of 
Los Angeles is conceived as privately owned—one’s own piece of paradise. In this 
scenario, there is no need for public space—everyone has it in their own backyard. 
Th is foundational ethos of suburbanization and the econo-political machine 
that produced it en masse is described well by urban historian Dolores Hayden:
Th e Hoover era established a national pattern of urbanization based on federal subsidies 
to stimulate the consumption of houses, cars, and consumer goods by white, male-
headed households. Th e visions of the ‘growth machines’ never included public space.161
Th e individualistic ethos of America has indeed produced a robust vehicle for the 
‘pursuit of happiness’ but, unlike its rhetoric of ‘equality for all’, its public realm is only 
the aggregation of the private territories of the dominant class. Th e relative scarcity of 
parks and public space in Los Angeles (see Figures 3.14 and 3.15), especially in low-income 
minority neighbourhoods, attests to this.
3.5 Income Inequality
Americans today live in a starkly unequal society. Inequality is greater now than it 
has been at any time in the last century, and the gaps in wages, income, and wealth 
are wider in the US than they are in any other democratic and developed economy. 
Th e dimensions of that inequality are both familiar and disheartening. A smaller 
share of national income is fl owing to wages and earnings, and—more important—
inequality within that labour share is widening. As a result, wage growth has fl atlined 
for a generation. Middle-income workers make no more now than they did in the late 
1970s; those in the lower wage cohort have lost ground over that span. Th e current 
inequality of labour income in the United States, as Thomas Piketty concludes, 
“is probably higher than in any other society at any time in the past, anywhere in 
the world, including societies in which skill disparities were extremely large.”162 
Th e growing gap in income (including non-wage income like returns 
on investment or capital gains) is even starker. Between 1979 and 2007, 
the real incomes of the richest one percent almost tripled, while the real 
incomes of the median household inched up only about 25 percent—and that 
161 Dolores Hayden, “Building the American Way,” in Th e Politics of Public Space, Edited by Setha Low and Neil Smith, (New 
York: Routledge, 2006), 4
162 Th omas Piketty, Capital in the 21st Century (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2014), 265.
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Fig. 3.16 Income inequality—Los Angeles and other major US cities
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almost all due to an increase in labor force participation and hours worked  .
Inequality in wealth (the sum total of household savings, home equity, 
investments, and debts) is starker still. Th e richest 1 percent claims about a 
third of the nation’s wealth; the top 5 percent claim over 60 percent.  Th ese 
shares have grown steadily over the last generation. Th e recession took a big 
bite out of middle-class wealth (much of which is vested in home equity). And 
the  gains of the recovery  have fl owed almost exclusively to the richest Americans.
For all the staggering comparisons—between rich and poor, between then and 
now, between the United States and other nations—we lack a clear and compelling 
account of how and why we arrived at this point. Our current economic troubles 
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have aimed a spotlight at our inequality problem, but they did not create it.
What did? Conventional explanations generally posit one or both of two 
scenarios. Th e fi rst: somebody took the money. Th is version stresses Wall Street 
greed and the Bush-era tax cuts and features a plutocracy determined to claim more 
than its share of private wealth and shoulder less than its share of public goods. Th e 
second: something happened to the economy. Th is version has a backstory in the 
inexorable march of globalization and technological change, and a more recent plot 
twist: the recession that began in 2007 and—for most of us—has not yet ended. 
Th ese accounts are not so much wrong as they are misleadingly incomplete, inattentive 
to longer-term historical trends and to the political choices made across that history. A 
fuller explanation starts to come into focus when we consider the political and economic 
conditions that prevailed right after the Second World War. At that historical moment, 
the United States displayed much narrower gaps between the rich and poor than we do 
now. Th e gains of economic growth back then were much more broadly distributed. And 
working families (at least white working families) enjoyed much greater economic security.
Th is was no accident or lucky combination of circumstances. It was the outcome 
of political struggle and policy choices that erected a foundation and a structure for 
shared prosperity. Th e inequality of the 20th century’s early years actually began 
closing before economic growth took off  in the 1940s, as a consequence of the 
political response to the Great Depression. Th anks to this response, federal support for 
collective bargaining rights sustained a surge in labor organization that dramatically 
improving the bargaining power of America’s workers. Other political innovations 
of the New Deal—ranging from Social Security to the minimum wage—secured a 
fl oor for working-class incomes. Postwar social movements, especially civil rights and 
second-wave feminism, then girded that fl oor by closing off  avenues for discrimination.
Th e nation’s tax system and new regulatory obstacles to speculative fi nance erected 
something of a ceiling for higher incomes. Substantial public investments—the GI Bill 
support for access to higher education, mortgage subsidies for veterans, housing projects, 
the interstate highway system, and the Cold War—kept the rest of the structure in intact. 
Since then, that structure has essentially collapsed. Th is collapse is often recounted 
as an unfortunate but necessary response to changing economic conditions: the world 
has become a leaner, meaner, more competitive place. As a result, the policies of the New 
Deal—and the costs they imposed on business—had to go. But there is little evidence 
to actually support this account. Indeed, the initial handwringing over American 
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Fig. 3.17 Housing affordability—USA 10 largest markets
Fig. 3.18 Severely unaffordable markets—pre- and post- bubble
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economic decline came at a time when our principal competitors, Japan and Germany, 
boasted both higher wages and more expansive social programs than the United States.
Th is inequality, in the view of many neo-conservative economists, is not 
just the toll we pay for free markets, but an essential incentive within a market 
economy. Th is argument continues with the notion that people work hard to 
avoid poverty and even harder to get rich. Th us, any pursuit of ‘equal outcomes’ 
would stifl e this initiative and the economic growth on which we all depend. Th e 
central premise of this argument asserts that the poor will fi nd themselves much 
better off  with a thin slice of a growing pie than with a thicker slice of a small one.
Th ere is little evidence—historical or economic—to substantiate this assertion. Th e 
‘market incentives’ argument holds water only as long as hard work is reliably rewarded in 
the short term (with wages) and in the long term (with economic mobility)—a prospect 
that has diminished in the last thirty years. Th e economy does not need inequality to 
grow. In fact, nearly the reverse is true. In the US’s recent history, sustained economic 
growth is closely associated with a relatively equitable distribution of economic rewards
Stark and sustained inequality discourages those at the bottom of the income 
distribution ladder (whose hard work goes unrewarded), and encourages those at the 
top to engage in short-sighted speculation—much of which (predatory lending and 
usurious credit card rates) exploits the poor and widens the gap. Inequality matters, 
most obviously and directly, to those whom it leaves behind. Th is includes the very 
poor—the ‘underclass’ or ‘the truly disadvantaged’—who have long been cordoned off  
from the rewards and opportunities enjoyed by most Americans, but also the broad 
middle class, for whom growing inequality has begun to erode wealth, incomes, living 
standards, and opportunities. Inequality in society at large aff ects the well-being and 
prosperity of all who live within it and, ultimately, diminishes economic growth. 
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Fig. 3.19 Los Angeles—home affordability: ownership
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Fig. 3.20 Los Angeles—home affordability: renting
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Fig. 3.21 Los Angeles—home affordability: new housing units
Fig. 3.22 Los Angeles-Ellis Act Evictions—rent-controlled units withdrawn from market
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Fig. 3.23 Los Angeles—income sufficiency
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 4.0     T H E  R I G H T  T O  T H E  C I T Y  /
E X C A V A T I N G  T H E  C O M M O N S
4.1. Th e Right to the City
More and more, the spaces of the modern city are being produced for us rather than by us.163
Don Mitchell
Th e right to the city manifests itself as a superior form of rights: right to freedom, 
to individualization in socialization, to habitat and to inhabit. Th e right to the 
ouvre, to participation and appropriation, are implied in the right to the city.164 
Henri Lefebvre
Th e right to the city is far more than the individual liberty to access urban 
resources: it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city. It is, moreover, 
a common rather than an individual right since this transformation inevitably 
depends upon the exercise of a collective power to reshape the processes of 
urbanization. Th e freedom to make and remake our cities and ourselves is, I want 
to argue, one of the most precious yet most neglected of our human rights.165
David Harvey
Th e concept of the ‘right to the city’ was introduced by sociologist and philosopher Henri 
Lefebvre in his work La Droit de la Ville (Th e Right to the City) in 1968. He posited that all 
urban dwellers, regardless of citizenship, ethnicity, ability, gender, etcetera, had the right 
to participate in shaping the city. Th ose who had been excluded and marginalized had an 
inherent right to be part of the production of the urban space for their needs and aspirations, 
in addition to those actors already included within the generative body politic of the city.
Lefebvre’s work marks an important moment in what has been dubbed the 
‘spatial turn’, in which the perspectives of geography, architecture, and other 
spatially-oriented disciplines have risen to the fore to complement the study of 
history, politics and economics; as these disciplines have traditionally treated space 
as an abstract and passive fi eld upon which the dialectical forces of human activity 
have been inscribed. Th e ‘spatial turn’ has ascribed an agency to spatial relations 
in which history, society and the production of space all interact in a generative 
163 Don Mitchell, Th e Right to the City: Social Justice and the Fight for Public Space (New York: Guilford Press, 2003), 18.
164 Henri Lefebvre, “Th e Right to the City,” In Writing on Cities, edited and translated by E. Kofman and E. Lebas, 63-181, 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 174. Originally published as Le Droit a la Ville. Paris: Anthropos, 1968.
165 David Harvey, “Th e Right to the City,” In New Left Review 53, September-October 2008, 23-40, http://newleftreview.org/
II/53/david-harvey-the-right-to-the-city, 23.
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trialectic. Th inkers such as Lefbvre, Guy Debord, David Harvey, Edward Soja, Erik 
Swyngedouw and Don Mitchell have made major contributions to the emergence of 
this approach, which is now embedded in contemporary discourse and is fundamental 
to emerging fi elds such as political ecology. Th e ‘spatial turn’ has also concretized the 
study of justice and human rights, informing fi elds such as environmental justice.
Th e right to the city has become a robust platform for a wide range of grassroots 
movements, as it can bring together a diverse range of interests under a conceptual 
umbrella that aligns a multitude of environmental and social justice issues. In its platform 
statement, the non-governmental organization Th e Right to the City asserts these points:
-Land for People vs. Land for Speculation
Th e right to land and housing that is free from market speculation and that serves
the interests of community building, sustainable economies, and cultural and
political space.
-Land Ownership
Th e right to permanent ownership of urban territories for public use.
-Economic Justice
Th e right of working class communities of color, women, queer and transgender
people to an economy that serves their interests.
-Indigenous Justice
Th e right of First Nation indigenous people to their ancestral lands that have
historical or spiritual signifi cance, regardless of state borders and urban or rural
settings.
-Environmental Justice
Th e right to sustainable and healthy neighborhoods & workplaces, healing, quality
health care, and reparations for the legacy of toxic abuses such as brown fi elds,
cancer clusters, and superfund sites.
-Freedom from Police & State Harassment
Th e right to safe neighborhoods and protection from police, INS/ICE, and vigilante
repression, which has historically targeted communities of color, women, queer and
transgender people.
-Immigrant Justice
Th e right of equal access to housing, employment, and public services regardless
of race, ethnicity, and immigration status and without the threat of deportation by
landlords, ICE, or employers.
-Services and Community Institutions
Th e right of working class communities of color to transportation, infrastructure
and services that refl ect and support their cultural and social integrity.
-Democracy and Participation
Th e right of community control and decision making over the planning and
governance of the cities where we live and work, with full transparency and
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accountability, including the right to public information without interrogation.
-Reparations
Th e right of working class communities of color to economic reciprocity and
restoration from all local, nation and transnational institutions that have exploited
and/or displaced the local economy.
-Internationalism
Th e right to support and build solidarity between cities across national boundaries,
without state intervention.
-Rural Justice
Th e right of rural people to economically healthy and stable communities that
are protected from environmental degradation and economic pressures that force
migration to urban areas.166
Th e right to the city, therefore, extends beyond the right to access to basic life needs, 
like food, water and housing. While this is an essential and foundational component, 
Mitchell states that “simply guaranteeing the right to housing may not be suffi  cient to 
guaranteeing a right to the city, but it is a necessary step toward guaranteeing that right.”167 
Th e right to the city can be more accurately described as a right to participate in shaping 
the urban space as both an individual and as a community, and the right for all to contest 
the appropriation of the city in a “critique of human geography whereby individuals and 
communities must construct places and events commensurate with the appropriation not 
just of their labor, but of their total history”168 Th is is an inherently political process, as the 
rights to competing uses and ideals are contested, and the frictions of these struggles are not 
easily and simply resolved. Th e logic of capitalism however, is relatively straightforward 
and friction-free, in that the highest and best (most profi table) use is privileged and 
should, necessarily, be the inevitable outcome of processes in the production of space.
4.2. Capital Accumulation and the Appropriation of the City
Th e city, as well as wider-ranging processes of urbanization, has been progressively 
subsumed into the capitalist system. Development continues to be predominantly driven 
by the optimization of conditions and processes favourable to capital accumulation. 
Th e right to the city, therefore, fundamentally challenges the spatial relations and 
strategies of the capitalist system and the resultant power structures that drive urban 
development and the production of urban space. David Harvey asserts that “if the 
capitalist form of urbanization is so completely embedded in and foundational for the 
166 Th e Right to the City, “Mission & History,” Accessed April 17, 2015, http://righttothecity.org/about/mission-history/.
167 Mitchell, Ibid., 19.
168 Guy Debord, Th e Society of the Spectacle (New York: Zone Books, 1994), 126.
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reproduction of capitalism, then it also follows that alternative forms of urbanization 
must necessarily become central to any pursuit of an anti-capitalist alternative.”169
Mitchell extends this critique of capitalism, and the foundational private 
property rights upon which they are based, into an ontological argument in which:
a world defi ned by private property, then, public space (as the space for representation) 
takes on exceptional importance…in a society where all property is private, those 
who own none (or whose interests aren’t otherwise protected by a right to access 
private property) simply cannot be, because they would have no place to be.”170 
This argument offers powerful justification for the right to the city being as 
intrinsic to basic human rights as the right to life, liberty and security of person.171
Neoliberal capitalism has come to dominate the global socio-economic 
order to such a degree that it is diffi  cult to imagine a world without it, but the 
city may be the place where we can see a past before it and imagine a future 
beyond it. Th e city is an enduring social construction that has seen a multitude 
of economic and political orders come and go, as well as the stage upon which we 
can witness and participate in its democratizing processes, Saskia Sassen states:
Large cities have long been complex and incomplete. Th is has enabled the incorporation 
of diverse people, logics, politics. A large, mixed city is a frontier zone where actors 
from diff erent worlds can have an encounter for which there are no established 
rules of engagement, and where the powerless and the powerful can actually meet…
Such a mix of complexity and incompleteness ensures a capacity to shape an 
urban subject and an urban subjectivity. It can partly override the religious 
subject, the ethnic subject, the racialised subject and, in certain settings, also 
the diff erences of class. Th ere are moments in the routines of a city when we 
all become urban subjects – rush hour is one such mix of time and space.
But today, rather than a space for including people from many diverse backgrounds and 
cultures, our global cities are expelling people and diversity. Th eir new owners, often 
part-time inhabitants, are very international – but that does not mean they represent 
many diverse cultures and traditions. Instead, they represent the new global culture of 
the successful – and they are astoundingly homogeneous, no matter how diverse their 
countries of birth and languages. Th is is not the urban subject that our large, mixed 
cities have historically produced. Th is is, above all, a global “corporate” subject.172
169 David Harvey, Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution (New York: Verso, 2012), 65.
170 Mitchell, Ibid., 34.
171 UN General Assembly. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 3, December 10, 1948, 217 A (III). Accessed Novem-
ber 17, 2015. http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html.
172 Saskia Sassen, “Who owns our cities – and why this urban takeover should concern us all,” Th e Guardian Cities, November 
24, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/nov/24/who-owns-our-cities-and-why-this-urban-takeover-should-concern-us
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Th e primary locus of global capitalism in the urban realm is large-scale, and 
often predatory, investment in and manipulation of the real estate market. Sassen 
refers, in the above passage, to investment appropriation by large-scale corporate 
developments, fi nanced by international capital networks. Th is phenomenon also 
occurs at the neighbourhood level in the process known as gentrifi cation, in which 
those, according to David Harvey, “who create an interesting and stimulating everyday 
neighborhood life lose it to the predatory practices of the real estate entrepreneurs, 
the fi nanciers and upper class consumers bereft of any urban social imagination. Th e 
better the common qualities a social group creates, the more likely it is to be raided 
and appropriated by private profi t-maximizing interests.”173 Th is is frequently, however, 
not neighbourhood renewal, but a top-down process that abstracts and fetishizes 
community resources into ‘brands’ like ‘art district’, fi nancializes them and then moves 
this capital back into larger networks of investment and accumulation in a “highly 
localized process that articulates broader politico-economic forces like globalization.”174
Th e process of gentrifi cation points to a larger phenomenon of appropriation of 
the unique cultural heritage of cities such as London, Paris, Istanbul or New York, into 
a process of cultural ‘branding’ that enhances these places’ value and their ability to 
extract what David Harvey refers to as “monopoly rents”175, the enhanced economic 
value of a place relative to others due to its uniqueness. A Las Vegas hotel can construct 
an Eiff el Tower, a Venetian canal or an Egyptian pyramid, but it doesn’t hold the same 
caché or economic value of the original, in which “claims to uniqueness, authenticity, 
particularity, and specialty underlie the ability to capture monopoly rents.”176 Th is 
extraction of monopoly rents fi nds its clearest expression in the tourism industry, but 
is also a substantial foundation of the development boom and rising real estate values 
in global cities whose cultural caché is an appealing amenity to the global economic 
elite. A rapidly increasing share of global economic activity is being channeled to 
these major global cities and the fi nancial markets of which they are the central nodes.
Th e right to the city is fundamental to contemporary urban life, but the forces 
of neoliberal capitalism have greatly eroded this right. Increasingly becoming 
the territory of an emergent global elite class, the world’s greatest cities have 
progressively vacated citizens’ participation in determining their collective futures. 
173 Harvey, Ibid., 78.
174 Jason Hackworth, Th e Neoliberal City: Governance, Ideology, and Development in American Urbanism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 2007), 123.
175 Harvey, Ibid., 103.
176 Ibid.
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How we begin to reclaim agency in shaping the future of the city, and in doing 
so, reclaim agency in shaping our collective lives, is a fundamental question.
4.3. Excavating the Commons
Any anticapitalism has to begin with a reconstruction of our understanding of capitalism 
itself, in particular an understanding that views capitalism as a porous system that can 
be exploited at the edges, rather than a monolith that must be attacked with force.177 
Jason Hackworth
We are so used to thinking of the capitalist market and government as the only 
two means of organizing economic life that we overlook the other organizing 
model in our midst that we depend on daily to deliver a range of goods 
and services that neither market nor government provides. The Commons 
predates both the capitalist market and representative government and is 
the oldest form of institutionalized, self-managed activity in the world.178
Jeremy Rifkin
Th e term ‘commons’ is derived from the traditional English legal term of common land; 
referred to as “Th e Commons”. While this common land might have been individually or 
collectively owned, the use of this land and its resources were available to all (usufructuary 
rights), but was subject to regulation of types of uses allowed, such as grazing of livestock, 
hunting, fi shing, and foraging. In contemporary parlance, the ‘commons’ has come to 
refer to the cultural and natural resources accessible to all members of society, such as 
air, water, and language. Economist Raj Patel refers to the commons as a “resource, most 
often land, [which] refers both to the territory and to the ways people allocate the goods 
that come from that land. Th e commons has traditionally provided food, fuel, water, and 
medicinal plants for those who used it—it was the poorest people’s life-support system.”179
One of the historical trends in the emergence of capitalism can be traced to the 
phenomenon known as the ‘enclosure of the commons’. Th is was a consolidation of 
commonly held lands in England into larger, privately owned tracts. Th is process began with 
private transactions, but was greatly enlarged in scope through a series of parliamentary acts.
Th e rapid increase of enclosure between approximately 1750 to 1850, often 
eff ected by Parliamentary acts rather than private transactions, made it a highly 
177 Jason Hackworth, Th e Neoliberal City: Governance, Ideology, and Development in American Urbanism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 2007), 196.
178 Jeremy Rifkin, Th e Zero Marginal Cost Society: Th e Internet of Th ings, the Collaborative Commons, and the Eclipse of Capitalism 
(New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 31.
179 Raj Patel, Th e Value of Nothing (New York: Harper Collins, 2009), 92.
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visible and controversial practice. Th e passage of the Inclosure (Consolidation) 
Act of 1801, refl ected the recognition of the accelerated pace of enclosure. While 
commoners were compensated for their losses, they were generally given smaller 
and less arable parcels of land or allowed to remain only on the condition that they 
take on the prohibitive expense of fencing their allotment. Approximately 4,000 
parliamentary acts were passed in this period, leaving virtually no common land.180
Th is is a foundational example of the increasing commodifi cation and privatization 
of resources which have reached a critical point in the era of late neoliberal capitalism. 
Resources, fundamental to life itself such as water, seeds and DNA, to name only a few, 
are now subject to varying levels of private ownership and control. Th is encroachment of 
capital into the deepest realms of life and matter is highly problematic and contentious, but 
is, however, triggering a productive discourse into the nature of private versus collective 
ownership rights and the limits of capitalism and its commodifi cation of the biosphere.
One of the defi ning crises of contemporary life is the unfettered growth of market 
values as a way to govern resources and ourselves. Th is has resulted in the privatization 
and commodifi cation or ‘enclosure’ of the commons. Resources that belong to 
everyone, morally or legally, are being increasingly subsumed by capital markets, 
shifting ownership and control to private companies. Th e market effi  ciencies touted by 
their proponents can be misleading and illusory, however, because they often depend 
upon unacknowledged subsidies from the commons (for example, discount access to 
public resources) and the displacement of costs to the common realm (pollution, social 
disruption, and harm to future generations). Enclosure does not add value nor maximize 
the benefi t of all; it merely privatizes benefi t at the expense of the common wealth.
‘Th e commons’ is a useful term for contemporary political discourse and practice 
because it provides a new framework for re-situating market processes in a social, political, 
and ecological context. It is a robust discursive model for determining the resources which 
should not be privatized for market activity and capital accumulation, but should remain 
non-commoditized and ‘owned’ (in a broadly democratic and civil sense) by everyone. 
Th e commons model maintains the right to remove resources, bodies and ecologies from 
the shackles of enclosure and commodifi cation.  It would, therefore, be fundamentally 
wrong to express the value of an endangered species, a worker’s life, or an aquifer as a dollar 
sum in a cost-benefi t analysis. It can be argued that it is as equally morally repugnant 
180 Ellen Rosenman, “On Enclosure Acts and the Commons.” BRANCH: Britain, Representation and Nineteenth-Century His-
tory. Ed. Dino Franco Felluga. (Extension of Romanticism and Victorianism on the Net. Accessed January 11, 2016. http://www.
branchcollective.org/?ps_articles=ellen-rosenman-on-enclosure-acts-and-the-commons,) 2.
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to sell off  the democratic processes of our highest public institutions through corporate 
campaign contributions as it would be to allow people to sell their bodies, babies, or genes. 
Th ese extreme examples give a cogent illustration of the dire, yet logical conclusions of 
the processes of the market and capital accumulation. In counterpoint, the discourse 
engendered by the commons framework gives us a language for talking about extra-
market values and their importance. Th e commons, for example, allows us to talk about 
the human necessities of life such as food, water, transportation, housing, education, 
and medicine, to name a few, that may otherwise be seen solely as market commodities.
Representational democratic governance has, traditionally, been the mechanism 
through which the destructive excesses of capitalism have been resisted and the benefi ts 
it has accrued have been more equitably distributed. Th e power, scope and effi  cacy 
of these institutions have been eroded in the last few decades, resulting in a crisis of 
confi dence and a growing disparity between economic elites and the rest of humanity. 
Th e commons model does not propose to supplant top-down representational 
democratic governance, but to bolster its resistance to unfettered capital accumulation 
and renew the democratic process through a multitude of grassroots, bottom-up 
initiatives that can more eff ectively represent the concerns and serve the needs of a vast 
and complex array of communities that constitute our contemporary global milieu. Th e 
governance of resources and human activity which has been defi ned by the private-
public dialectic has reached an impasse where the private sphere of global capital 
networks is asserting its dominance. A more equitable and sustainable governance 
can be revived through the emergence of a third pillar of governance—the commons.
Th e commons, the market and the public sector organize human activity and create 
value in distinctly diff erent ways, but they do not necessarily operate in separate, distinct, 
and oppositional territories. Th ey are interdependent processes with inherent strengths 
and benefi ts when deployed appropriately. Th e goal is to negotiate a continually evolving 
balance between the three so that the value-creating capacities of each can be optimized.
It is important to recognize that the commons model is not only a defi nition of 
which resources should be de-commoditized and returned to the shared ownership and 
stewardship of all, but is also an array of active processes and a set of protocols to govern these 
processes. David Bollier off ers a prescient summary of this foundational notion where:
the commons certainly include physical and intangible resources of all sorts, 
but they are more accurately defined as paradigms that combine a distinct 
community with a set of social practices, values and norms that are used to 
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manage a resource. Put another way, a commons is a resource + a community + 
a set of social protocols. Th e three are an integrated, interdependent whole.”181 
Th us, the commons is not just a noun, but is also a verb. ‘Commoning’ is the active 
process by which communities can mobilize to not only protect their resources but to 
equitably and sustainably manage these resources for the benefi t of all in perpetuity.
Deploying ‘the commons’ as a discursive model and a set of practices fosters our eff orts 
to re-frame the terms of discussion of a wide range of issues and bolster our personal stake 
in protecting shared public resources. It helps draw new linkages among disparate issues, 
and in this sense, fosters the development of a shared language, a set of practices and an 
emergence of alliances between a diverse array of public-interest constituencies. Similarly, 
the discourse of the commons validates a number of specifi c governance models—civic 
institutions, stakeholder trusts, legal mechanisms, social customs and norms—that can help 
us protect and manage our common resources eff ectively. Th e emerging commons sector 
won’t supplant markets and corporations, but will complement their ability to generate 
positive economic activity while protecting us from many of their destructive tendencies. 
Achieving the right to the city in the face of intensifying pressures of capitalism and the 
declining capacity of all levels of government to provide physical and social infrastructure 
is a challenging proposition. Th e commons model, however, has the potential to off er a 
path forward. It can unite a disparate array of dissenting voices, mobilize political action, 
and lead the charge for the re-establishment of spaces that are truly public. Beyond 
this, its most eff ective potential, in my estimation, is the transfer of property from the 
inventory of capital markets into the hands of the communities that will be occupying 
it. Property is transformed into place when it is occupied by communities of people that 
are intimately invested in every aspect of its success for today and future generations. 
181 David Bollier, Th ink Like a Commoner: A Short Introduction to the Life of the Commons (Gabriola Island, BC: New Society 
Publishers, 2014), 27.
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5.0     COMPTON COMMONS
Th is thesis has explored a wide range of contemporary global issues with an 
emphasis on how they are manifested in the socio-economic and built fabric of 
Los Angeles.  It has identifi ed the systemic operations of global techno-scientifi c 
capitalism and its perpetual production of crises as the locus of these issues. 
Th e challenge that emerges, in this thesis, and its contribution to the broader 
discourse in which it is embedded, is how to begin to establish an equitable, 
productive, and ecologically responsible approach to all aspects of how we live.
To address the primary issues investigated in this thesis—water scarcity and 
spatially manifested socio-economic inequity in Los Angeles—a design-based 
masterplan is proposed. Th is masterplan, while predominantly spatial in nature, 
is comprised of many elements that provide a legal and economic framework. 
Th is thesis makes no claim to universality or a comprehensive solution. Th is 
design proposal attempts to craft a nuanced, locally-scaled response to these issues in 
a manner that can provide a built environment that fosters the prosperity and civic 
engagement of a diverse and resilient community that manages its resources equitably 
and sustainably. Th e ambition of this proposal is to design a masterplan with a varied 
and engaging array of public spaces and modest, yet dynamic architecture that supports 
the community in a generous, yet fi scally prudent manner. In addition to landscape and 
architecture, it will be designed to accommodate a wide range of grassroots community 
initiatives and small-scale entrepreneurial opportunities. Th e overarching ambition of 
the design proposal is to remove the economic activity and fundamental needs of the 
local community—whether it is housing, employment, recreation, or culture—from 
being located exclusively in the territory of capitalism, or being provided in a top-down 
manner from government bureaucracies, and return them to local control. To achieve 
these ambitions, a strategic declaration for Compton Commons is detailed below.
5.1. Compton Commons: Strategic declaration for the equitable city
Th ese points are held to be operative truths—principles that defi ne the vision for 
Compton Commons—and the practices that will form the path to their realization.
1. Access to, and the management of, our common resources is the right of all  
 people.
Air, water, language, culture,…belong to everyone.
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In Compton Commons, shared resources are held, managed and enjoyed by the 
community.
2. Water is an essential common resource.
 It should be stewarded with judicious care and experienced joyously. 
Compton Commons is founded on the practice of radical conservation in a 
closed-loop system of safe, continuous water re-use in a built environment that 
celebrates the importance of water in our lives.
3. Make capitalism work for people, not the other way around.
Proponents of free-market capitalism claim that the market, left to operate unfettered, will 
produce at maximum effi  ciency, thereby generating optimal benefi t for all. Experience 
has shown this article of faith to be fundamentally fl awed, and, instead of universal 
benefi t, we have received systemic inequity and ecological devastation. Capitalism is 
a tool, not a cosmology, and should be deployed only in appropriate circumstances.
Compton Commons will ‘hack’ capitalism by acquiring two adjacent medium-
scale strip malls for the site of its development. Property will be transferred from 
private ownership to community ownership through the legal framework of a 
Community Land Trust (CLT). Here, the shopping mall will be supplanted as 
the central social institution of contemporary society and shopping itself will 
be demoted from the primary social activity to only one of many activities 
that comprise the social life of the community. A single-purpose capitalist 
institution will be subsumed into a diverse, community-based urbanism.
4. Aff ordable housing is a prerequisite to the exercise of all human rights.
It is problematic, if not impossible, to assert the right to be without a place to live.
A central aspect of Compton Commons is the provision of housing to a wide 
range of household types and sizes, from single people to extended families. It is 
designed to be aff ordable in perpetuity through the aforementioned  land tenure 
model of the CLT, and located within a supportive community where a wide 
range of urban amenities are within easy walking distance.
5. Independent micro-enterprise is essential to community development. .
Returning the basis of economic activity to local communities strengthens other 
aspects of community life and reclaims power and self-determination from abstract 
and impersonal global fi nancial markets. True economic value resides in people’s 
labour and the judicious stewardship of resources in providing for actual needs, not in 
limitless exploitation and abstract fi nancial markets with a questionable relationship 
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to actual economic activity. 
Compton Commons will provide a supportive venue for all manner 
of productive economic activity and entrepreneurial opportunities. An 
emphasis will be placed on the provision of infrastructures, both physical 
and social, that foster microretail ventures, craft enterprises, and small-scale 
fi rms engaged in the development of web, app, and digital media content 
and platforms. Th ese economic ventures will be supported by community-
based and peer-to-peer education, training, and skills development.
6. Urban design is focused on ‘place-making’, not only form and function. 
Th e modern capitalist city is predominantly a commodity exchange infrastructure 
where function reigns supreme and form is a signifi er of the hierarchy of 
the disposition of these functions. Th e right to remake the city into the 
image of collective desires will be asserted—an interconnected network of 
neighbourhoods, places and spaces that affi  rm our humanity and serve our needs.
Compton Commons will be designed as an interconnected series of public 
spaces of varying scales, enlivened by water-based landscapes, gardens planted 
with native and drought-resistant plants, and open, hardscaped plazas that off er 
fl exible, unprogrammed spaces for a wide variety of planned and spontaneous 
community uses. Th e architecture will support these public spaces, defi ning their 
edges and creating outdoor ‘rooms’. Th e process of urbanization will be reversed 
and the civic sphere will be re-invigorated by the renewed practice of city-building.
5.2. Compton-Background and Context
Known as the ‘Hub City’ because of its location in the geographical center of Los Angeles 
County, Compton is one of the oldest cities in the county. Th e area was settled in 1867, 
by a band of pioneering families, led by Griffi  th Dickenson Compton. Th e settlement 
became known as Compton in 1869 and was offi  cially incorporated on May 11, 1888.182
Compton had a total population of 96,455 in the 2010 US Census, with an 
estimated population in 2014 of 98,597. Th e population of Compton is 65.00% 
Hispanic/Latino, 32.90% Black/African American; with all other ethnicities 
comprising 2.1% of the population (see Figure 5.2.). “Compton went from being 
majority white in the 1950s to majority African American in the 1970s to majority 
Latino in the 1990s. Th ese shifts occurred in tandem with the town’s progressive 
182 City of Compton, “History of the City,” Accessed February 11, 2015, http://www.comptoncity.org/visitors/history.asp.
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Fig. 5.1 Map of Compton and Los Angeles County
impoverishment; by 2000, 28 percent of the town’s residents lived below the poverty 
line, double California’s 14.2 percent fi gure and more than twice the national 12.4 
percent.”183 Th e median household income is low- to middle-income (see Figure 
5.3), with a signifi cant percentage of families occupying the lowest income bracket.
183 Emily Straus, “Straight Outta Suburbia,” Th e Atlantic, August 14, 2015, Accessed November 3, 2015, http://www.theatlantic.
com/politics/archive/2015/08/compton-california-the-other-suburban-story/401282/.
Los Angeles County boundaries
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Compton boundaries
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Fig. 5.2 Compton—population characteristics and demographics
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Language other than English spoken at home
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High school graduate or higher, persons age 25 years+
Bachelor's degree or higher, age 25 years+
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With a disability, under age 65 years
Persons without health insurance, under age 65 years
Economy (2010-2014)
In civilian labor force, age 16 years+
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Fig. 5.3 Compton—median household income by census tract (2014)
Fig. 5.4 Compton—population density by census tract (2014)
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Fig. 5.5 Compton—zoning (2014)
Compton has been a predominantly working-class city, with a substantial area of 
land zoned industrial. (see Figure 5.5) Th is industrial employment base once had a 
signifi cant number of highly-paid, unionized jobs, but, refl ecting US-wide trends of 
the past 40 years, these jobs have largely been replaced by low-pay, unskilled positions.
Compton was developed as a primarily residential inner-ring suburb of Los 
Angeles. Its built fabric is composed primarily of single-family detached homes, low-
rise apartment and townhouse complexes, as well as single-storey retail developments. 
(see Figure 5.8) As residential suburban development moved further from the central 
core in the 20th century, Compton experienced a steady decline in the number of 
middle-income families as this demographic moved further out into newer subdivisions 
on the suburban fringes. “Compton is emblematic of inner-ring suburbs, which 
developed next to central cities as primarily single-use, residential-only subdivisions. 
commercial
mixed-use
residential: single-family
residential: multi-family
industrial
institutional
parks
transportation and infrastructure
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Fig. 5.6 Compton—community land use
Th ese suburbs lack strong business districts, limiting their commercial potential, and they 
contain aging housing stocks, which diminish their appeal to higher-income earners.”184
To address the needs of population growth and sustainable development, this thesis 
proposes to increase the density and intensify the range of program in inner-ring suburbs, 
such as Compton, through mixed-use infi ll development situated, whenever possible, 
near public transit. As a legal entity, Compton is an independent city—ineligible to 
receive many of the benefi ts aff orded to the City of Los Angeles, with its broader tax 
base, but is still responsible for carrying a large share of its own infrastructure costs. Th is 
thesis takes the position that, if a municipality is excluded from the shared provision of 
infrastructure from the larger urban entity within which it is situated, it should assert its 
independence in all civic matters and re-organize itself as a truly independent entity, not 
184 Ibid.
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Fig. 5.7 Compton—aggregate environmental vulnerability
just a suburb. It is this point that forms the basis for the proposal of a new civic center for 
Compton that is not merely one of many nodes within the greater Los Angeles 
area, but is the social and economic engine of a strong local community. 
5.3. Water Stewardship
Th is thesis has examined a wide range of water issues in Los Angeles, both historical 
and contemporary. Th e most critical of these is water scarcity, exacerbated by recent 
droughts, population growth, and the uncertainty of future water supply wrought 
by climate change. Th ese crises highlight the importance of a long-term strategy that 
not only prioritizes conventional conservation measures, but embraces more radical, 
innovative approaches to ensuring a reliable, sustainable water supply in perpetuity.
Historically, as Los Angeles’ population grew; increased water demand was met by 
procuring this resource from increasingly distant sources. Today, this approach is no longer 
tenable, and any increase in water demand and decrease in available resources is addressed 
through progressively stringent, government-mandated conservation measures. Th is is a 
60-80%
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Fig. 5.8 Compton—building heights
positive and necessary measure, but it fails to provide a robust and sustainable strategy for an 
uncertain future that may include an unprecedented and dramatic decline in the availability 
of water resources. Th ere are, however, two potential sources of water supply that have only 
been utilized to a fraction of their full potential—stormwater runoff  and greywater recycling.
one storey (<15’)
two storeys (15’-30’)
three storeys (30’-45’)
Building Height
four storeys (45’-60’)
5 or more storeys (>60’)
1 Storey 2 Storeys
3 Storeys 4+ Storeys
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5.3.1. Urban Runoff 
Th e extensive growth of the Greater Los Angeles area has created vast expanses of 
impervious surfaces: areas covered with buildings, roads, highways, parking lots, 
driveways and sidewalks where water cannot soak into the ground and return to the 
aquifers within the watershed. Th is development has dramatically altered the pre-existent 
processes of the hydrologic cycle, decreasing the level of infi ltration and signifi cantly 
reducing groundwater recharge. Th e amount of stormwater runoff  has, correspondingly, 
increased signifi cantly. Th e velocity of runoff  over paved surfaces is considerably faster 
than over vegetated surfaces, thus the peak fl ow —the maximum fl ow in a stream as a 
result of a storm event —occurs sooner, and is signifi cantly higher than it would be in 
pre-development conditions. Additionally, paved surfaces collect a variety of pollutants, 
including debris, oil, animal waste, pesticides, and other chemicals, which are transported 
in the runoff  to downstream waterbodies, impacting water quality and aquatic ecosystems.
Surface runoff  in areas of at least 75 percent impermeable cover will increase by a factor of 
nine or more, compared with an undeveloped area. Until the 1960s, the annual percentage 
of rainfall that infi ltrated into the ground or evaporated was more than 80 percent, with 
less than 20 percent of the rainfall converted into runoff . Th is ratio has steadily decreased 
since then, and now over 50 percent of the annual rainfall leaves the watershed as runoff .185
5.3.2. Th e Traditional Approach: Conveyance and Storage
In urban areas where natural drainage and storage processes have been signifi cantly 
altered, the objective of the design of stormwater management systems is to compensate 
for increased runoff  and decreased infi ltration; to serve as a substitute for the natural 
fl oodplain lost to development. Th e traditional design of stormwater systems focuses 
on the effi  cient conveyance of runoff  during a major storm event, based on historic 
rainfall statistics and runoff  calculations. Th e traditional stormwater management 
system consists of networks of engineered structures such as curbs, gutters, catch basins, 
storm sewers, and open channels. To expand system capacity, storage facilities such as 
detention and retention basins can be incorporated into the system to detain or retain a 
portion of runoff  to reduce peak fl ows in the channels. Th is stormwater is later released 
into the conveyance system after the peak fl ow has occurred. Th e design criteria for 
these traditional stormwater systems vary depending on the size of the facility and the 
185 US Environmental Protection Agency, “National Stormwater Calculator,” Last updated October 7, 2015, http://www2.epa.
gov/water-research/national-stormwater-calculator.
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magnitude of the design storm, the maximum rainfall event that the system is designed to 
manage. Th ese systems are designed with diff erent levels of fl ood protection, depending 
on the size of the drainage area and the design storm employed. Th e Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) Flood Insurance program requires that all regional systems, 
such as the Los Angeles River, provide 100-year fl ood protection. However, as new storm 
events are added to the hydrologic record, the magnitude of the design fl ood event is 
subject to continual revision. Th ese changes sometimes result in the need for expensive 
alterations to expand capacity as the calculated magnitude of fl ood events changes.
 
5.3.3. Conveyance Facilities
Conveyance facilities move water on or below the surface through a series of engineered 
structures. Th is is the oldest and most common approach to stormwater management. 
Conveyance facilities include gutters, catch basin inlets, pipes, open channels, and 
sometimes even streets. In general, they are reasonably economical and straightforward 
to design, build and maintain. Conveyance channels are designed to be hydraulically 
effi  cient. Smooth concrete allows for using a minimal width of channel and the least 
possible surface resistance or roughness to move water quickly through the watershed.
Changing the roughness of a channel surface, for example by lining a stream channel 
with concrete, has signifi cant impacts on the velocity of water fl ow, and consequently on 
the volume of water that a channel can convey in a certain amount of time. Th e capacity of 
the channel – how much water can move through it and how fast—is directly related to the 
roughness of the channel surface. Th e smoother the surface, the faster the water can fl ow 
over it. For a given channel width, the capacity of a natural channel containing rocks and 
vegetation to move water at a particular rate is considerably less than that of a concrete-lined 
channel with the same dimensions. Th us, a concrete channel could be much smaller in size 
than a natural channel to provide the same level of fl ood protection. A vegetated channel 
would need to occupy much more fl oodplain area in order to meet the same fl ood protection 
needs of a community. Because of this effi  ciency, concrete fl ood channels are sized to manage 
the occasional large storm without utilizing the adjacent fl oodplain normally occupied by 
fl ood fl ows in a natural river system during fl oods. Th is approach allows the fl ood conveyance 
footprint to be smaller, and maximizes the amount of land available for development.
5.3.4. Detention Basins
Detention basins are used in a fl ood control system to detain a portion of the fl ow 
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and slowly release the water after the peak runoff  has occurred. Detention basins 
reduce the peak runoff  volume, although the total stormwater volume conveyed by 
the system remains unchanged. Multipurpose facilities, such as those used for water 
conservation and fl ood protection, have a specifi c capacity reserved for stormwater 
storage. Th ese facilities must be carefully managed to ensure that capacity is available 
when needed. Single purpose facilities reserve the entire basin for stormwater storage.
5.3.5. Retention or Infi ltration Basins
Retention and infi ltration basins reduce the total volume of storm runoff  by retaining 
a portion of the runoff  and allowing it to infi ltrate (if the basin is permeable) and/
or evaporate. Th ese basins reduce the total stormwater volume that is conveyed 
downstream and correspondingly reduce the peak runoff . Th ey can also help 
to restore the base fl ow in streams by recharging groundwater. Th is has become 
an increasingly important component of maintaining Southern California’s 
groundwater supply. For example, an average of about 250,000 acre-feet of 
stormwater runoff  is captured for recharge annually within the Los Angeles and San 
Gabriel Rivers watersheds alone, utilizing spreading basins and instream options.186
Th ere are two types of retention or infi ltration basins. An inline basin is located 
in the fl ow path of a channel. An offl  ine basin is located outside the channel 
with runoff  diverted into it, with some sort of fl ow control to prevent overfi lling.
5.3.6. Th e Need for a New Approach
Th e effi  cient removal of stormwater to protect public health and safety from fl ooding 
is an important and desirable goal. Th ere is a growing realization, however, that the 
traditional approaches to stormwater and fl ood management have unintended 
consequences that aff ect the environment in a multitude of negative ways. Not 
only are we losing a valuable local resource—water, we have damaged our natural 
ecosystems by concreting stream channels and sending polluted urban stormwater 
runoff  into our rivers and the ocean. We have replaced part of the natural water 
cycle with an artifi cial system in which there is little connection between rainfall and 
underground aquifers. Currently, water imported from hundreds of miles away, such 
as the environmentally sensitive Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta and the Colorado 
186 Data.gov, “LADWP Stormwater Capture by Fiscal Year,” Last updated April 9, 2015, http://catalog.data.gov/dataset/ladwp-
stormwater-capture-by-fi scal-year-4f912.
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River, is used to replenish underground aquifers to make up for the loss of natural 
recharge from stormwater. Th is imported water is often more costly and less reliable 
than the development of local water resources such as the conservation of stormwater.
   Another drawback is that these engineered fl ood control channels create a potential 
hazard to the public. In the event that someone may be caught up in the swift fl ow 
of water rushing to the sea, people have been prohibited from entering the rivers for 
recreation. As a result we are increasingly alienated from our local rivers and streams 
and the natural habitat and recreational opportunities they once provided. Th ere is 
increasing interest in methods of managing stormwater runoff  that help restore the 
natural water balance. Stormwater may be managed as an asset, while at the same time 
maintaining the protection of life and property as the primary objective. One way to 
reduce the total volume and velocity of stormwater entering the fl ood management 
systems is through techniques that are distributed throughout the watershed to capture 
or slow runoff  at its source. Th is approach can reduce the overall threat to public safety 
while reducing pollution and increasing natural infi ltration and local water supplies.
5.3.7. Water Quality Concerns
Th ere are valid concerns as to whether infi ltration transports pollutants from surface 
water to groundwater. Research indicates that this is not necessarily the case. Th e 
Los Angeles Basin Water Augmentation Study examined the impact of stormwater 
infi ltration on groundwater quality. Several years of monitoring infi ltration at a 
number of locations with diff erent hydro-geologic conditions found no apparent 
trends to indicate that stormwater infi ltration negatively impacted groundwater 
quality. Soils have been shown to act as bio-fi lters, removing contaminants from 
surface water runoff  as it percolates down into groundwater basins. However, any 
area where infi ltration is planned, the site conditions must be carefully evaluated to 
ensure that soils are capable of infi ltrating the expected runoff  volume safely and with 
suffi  cient clearance to groundwater, and that there are not pre-existing conditions that 
might preclude infi ltration, such as soil contamination.187 Th e existence of extensive 
industrial land uses, and a multitude of EPA clean-up sites in Los Angeles, suggest 
that great care be taken with the assessment of potential groundwater infi ltration sites.
187 Th e Los Angeles and San Gabriel Rivers Watershed Council, “Los Angeles Basin
Water Augmentation Study,” Last modifi ed December 15, 2001, https://wiki.epa.gov/watershed2/index.php/LA_Basin_Wa-
ter_Augmentation_Study.
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5.3.8 Storm Frequency
Th e extreme nature of southwestern hydrology, with infrequent but high-intensity 
storm events, is frequently cited as the primary reason why traditional, hard-scaped 
infrastructure is a necessary stormwater management strategy. In much of the Los 
Angeles area, where areas once occupied by seasonal fl oodplains are now occupied by 
development, this is a valid concern. However, the more frequent small storms are 
signifi cant contributors to total rainfall. In the Los Angeles coastal plain, the number 
of storms that exceed the threshold of 0.75 inch occur just a few days per year. If the 
amount of runoff  generated from all storms, including the fi rst 0.75 inch of the larger 
storms, was captured for reuse or infi ltration it would represent more than 70 percent 
of annual rainfall. Depending on the soil type and how saturated the soil has already 
become, runoff  generated from the more typical small storms may be easily infi ltrated in 
areas that have a permeable surface. Th ese are the easiest places to infi ltrate stormwater. 
Th erefore, one of the aims of watershed management planning should be to minimize 
the amount of impermeable land cover. Th is increases opportunities for infi ltration of 
rainfall, groundwater recharge and the reduction of overall runoff  volume and velocity.
5.3.9 Multiple Purpose, Multiple Benefi t
As the watershed approach to planning and resource management gains attention, 
public agencies and communities are recognizing the fact that stormwater management 
systems can serve more than one purpose. Single purpose conveyance systems are 
increasingly viewed as throwing water (and therefore money) away. Th ey typically 
do not address other watershed management concerns—water supply, water quality, 
recreation, wildlife habitat – or take into account the funds that agencies spend, often 
independently, on each of these other concerns. Projects in a watershed that provide 
multiple benefi ts can therefore be eligible for multiple sources of funding, saving 
money and resources in the long run. Detention basins, for example, can be used for 
golf courses and parks. Hiking, biking, and equestrian trails can be added alongside 
stream channels. Many runoff  detention facilities in Los Angeles County, such as 
the Sepulveda Basin and Whittier Narrows, already provide such multiple uses and 
more, and others could be modifi ed to further enhance public use. Some of the many 
benefi ts that may be realized from multiple purpose projects include the following:
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Water supply
By increasing groundwater recharge with local stormwater, we can become less 
dependent on imported water to meet our drinking water needs. Using more 
stormwater for recharge also allows us to take advantage of unused storage capacity 
in our groundwater aquifers, further reducing our demand for imported water. 
Th is greatly increases the reliability of our water supply both locally and state-wide.
Energy savings
Th e use of stormwater for benefi cial purposes requires markedly less 
energy than conveying water from Northern California or the Colorado 
River, which both saves money and reduces greenhouse gas emissions.
Habitat
By restoring stream channels and recharge areas and creating new parks and 
treatment wetlands, we can provide  much needed habitat to replace our wetlands, 
and riparian and chaparral habitats lost to development.
Open space and recreation
Parks and open spaces provide needed recreation and access to open 
space in park-starved urban areas, while also increasing infi ltration and, 
in some cases, serving as fl ood detention facilities during large storms.
Water quality
By reducing the volume of runoff , water quality can be improved in downstream
waterbodies.
Restoration
Restoring natural stream functions provides erosion control and sediment
management. 
Cost savings
It is becoming increasingly costly to maintain the traditional concrete channels 
in already developed areas. Projects that serve multiple purposes are proving 
to be cost eff ective when all the multiple savings and benefi ts are considered.
Quality of life
Greening the urban hardscape increases property values and enhances 
the community by providing nearby recreation amenities and 
opportunities for greenways and for commuting by foot or bicycle.
5.3.10 Design Strategies
Low impact development (LID) is a comprehensive land development design approach 
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with a goal of maintaining and enhancing the pre-development hydrology of a site. 
Design principles strive to preserve natural landscape features and minimize impervious 
cover. Th e basic principle of LID is to mimic pre-development processes: manage rainfall 
at the source using distributed, decentralized small-scale systems and soft infrastructures. 
It is not possible to capture 100 percent of the runoff  in a watershed, but, what 
impact would capturing some portion of precipitation have on reducing total runoff  and 
increasing infi ltration? Th e Watershed Council conducted such an analysis for the Los 
Angeles basin, where most of the watersheds are classifi ed as some type of urban land 
use. On average, rainfall on these urban lands uses generates nearly 200 billion gallons 
of runoff  every year. If the existing SUSMP policy of capturing or treating the fi rst 0.75 
inch of rainfall was implemented throughout the Los Angeles Basin to capture and 
infi ltrate stormwater, groundwater recharge would potentially increase by 60 percent 
and stormwater runoff  would decrease by about half. Hypothetically, if runoff  from a 
0.75 inch rainfall event was captured on just half of the residential area—15 percent 
of the total basin—total runoff  would be reduced by approximately 30 percent. Th at 
translates into a diversion of approximately 43 billion gallons of water per year (about 
132,000 acre-feet), or enough to supply an estimated one million people for a year.
Th ere are several projects of varying scale that are addressing water conservation 
in southern California. An ambitious project that is achieving dramatic levels 
of water conservation is the Orange County Water District’s Groundwater 
Replenishment System, an award winning facility that is addressing southern 
California’s increasingly critical water scarcity. It is essentially a toilet-to-tap 
process that processes and purifi es sewage water to drinking level quality before 
pumping it into underground aquifers for later extraction as drinking water.
After wastewater is treated at the Orange County Sanitation District, it fl ows to 
the GWRS where it undergoes a state-of-the-art purifi cation process consisting of 
microfi ltration, reverse osmosis, and ultraviolet light with hydrogen peroxide. Th e 
resultant water is near-distilled-quality. Approximately 35 million gallons (132,500 cubic 
meters) per day of the GWRS water are pumped into injection wells to create a seawater 
intrusion barrier. Another 35 million gallons (132,500 cubic meters) are pumped daily 
to Orange County Water District’s percolation basins in Anaheim where the GWRS 
water naturally fi lters through sand and gravel to the deep aquifers of the groundwater 
basin.188 While this project is commendable for its complete re-use of water, it is highly 
188 Orange County Water District’s Groundwater Replenishment System, Accessed February 3, 2015, http://www.ocwd.com/
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energy-intensive and represents the type of large-scale infrastructural project that may not 
be aff ordable for many municipalities. It does, however, point to the multi-faceted approach 
to sustainable water conservation practices, which involves initiatives across multiple scales 
and approaches that involve both ‘high-tech’, ‘low-tech’, and ‘natural’ infrastructures.
Th e second recent project of note is the South Los Angeles Wetlands Park. Funded 
by the Proposition “O” water quality bond that voters approved in 2004, the nine-acre 
park was formerly an “underutilized and blighted” bus maintenance yard.189 Th is is an 
excellent example of repurposing a space that no longer served its original purpose. 
In this park, a series of constructed wetland ponds treats runoff  from the surrounding 
neighborhood before it is released to the LA River. Th is project has created a public 
space in a neighbourhood sorely in need of them, and when stormwater is available, 
it has proven eff ective in treating the urban runoff  it receives. However, if there was 
no rainfall for extended periods of time, potable water had to be used to keep the 
plants alive and ensure the continued functioning of the water treatment systems.
Th e approach adopted in the design proposal for Compton Commons will harvest stormwater 
from the local watershed and greywater from showers in a closed-loop system that is treated 
by constructed wetlands and recycled for all non-potable water uses within the development.
5.3.11. Constructed Wetlands
Constructed wetlands are designed and built to treat wastewater, mimicking the 
biotic and abiotic processes of natural wetlands. Th ey most frequently consist of 
a shallow depression in the ground with a level bottom. Th e fl ow is controlled in 
constructed wetlands so that the water is spread evenly among the wetland plants, 
allowing natural processes to occur and clean the wastewater more effi  ciently.
Constructed wetlands provide simple and eff ective wastewater treatment. Th ey 
can be used to treat wastewater from domestic, urban, agricultural, industrial 
and mining operations. Th eir up-front construction costs are much less (50 to 
90 percent) than conventional systems and their ongoing operating costs are 
similarly lower. Constructed wetlands off er aesthetic qualities and strengthen local 
ecosystems—enhancing and expanding habitats for all manner of fl ora and fauna.
Wastewater fl ows through a pipe from a septic tank or other type of primary wastewater 
treatment system into the constructed wetland. Th ere are several types of constructed 
189 “Adel Hagekhalil on Signifi cance of South LA’s Wetlands Park,” Th e Planning Report, http://planningreport.com/2012/02/26/
adel-hagekhalil-signifi cance-south-la-s-wetlands-park.
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wetlands. Wastewater can either fl ow on top of the existing soil (surface) or through a 
porous medium such as gravel (subsurface) (see Figure 5.9). Flow is distributed evenly 
across the width of the wetland cell. A waterproof liner is used on the sides and bottom 
of the cell to prevent leaks and assure adequate water for the wetland plants. Th is cell 
is planted with wetland plants such as cattails and bulrushes. Roots and stems of the 
plants form a dense mat. Here chemical, biological, and physical processes occur to 
treat the wastewater. Water levels are controlled in both surface and subsurface systems. 
In subsurface systems, the normal water level is kept just below a gravel surface, which 
improves treatment and controls the propagation of mosquitoes. Th e free water surface 
constructed wetland (see Figure 5.10) is the most similar to natural wetlands. It is essentially 
an open pond planted with a variety of aquatic plants. Emergent aquatic macrophytes 
have roots in the soil at the bottom of the body of water, but grow up through the water 
and have leaves and fl owers that extend into the air. Floating-leaved aquatic macrophytes 
fl oat on the surface of the water, and submerged aquatic macrophytes have roots in 
the soil at the bottom of the body of water, but remain submerged. (see Figure 5.10)
As wastewaters fl ow through the system, suspended solids and trace metals settle and 
are fi ltered. Plants and organic material also absorb trace metals. Organisms that live in 
water, on rocks, in soil, and on stems and roots of wetland plants use these organic materials 
and nutrients as food. Plants provide much of the oxygen needed by the organisms to live 
and grow. Plant roots keep the rocks or soil loose so that water can fl ow through easily.
Constructed wetlands will address many, but not every, wastewater need. Th ey 
may be employed to serve a wide range of urban and rural uses; their design can be 
tailored to the infl uent, the available land and the available budget. Th ey meet secondary 
treatment limits and can be designed for advanced treatment. Th eir construction 
and operating costs are low, compared to conventional ‘hard infrastructures’, and 
they do not require highly trained operators or extensive daily monitoring protocols.
Th e design proposal for Compton Commons will utilize vertical subsurface fl ow 
and free water surface CW’s to treat both the harvested stormwater and recycled 
greywater generated by the residential development on the site. In addition to the 
performative aspects of these constructed wetlands, they will be designed as central 
landscape features, animating the public spaces of the proposed development.
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Fig. 5.9 Los Angeles—typical household water use
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Fig. 5.10 conservation—stage #1
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Fig. 5.11 conservation—stage #2
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Fig. 5.12 Compton Commons strategy
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Fig. 5.13 vertical subsurface fl ow constructed wetland—schematic diagram
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Fig. 5.14 free water surface constructed wetland—schematic diagram
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5.4. Making Capitalism Work for People
A central tenet of Compton Commons is the creation of a space— physical, economic 
and political—that operates in an independent sphere outside the territories of 
capitalism and large-scale government. Th is is a humane state of exception in 
which standard protocols of power are suspended by community-driven legal 
mechanisms. Here, land tenure and resource management is community-based and 
its disposition is driven by transparent processes of contestation and consensus-
building. Capitalism and representative democracy are both driven by top-down, 
large-scale processes. Compton Commons operates within a legal framework that is 
driven by local, small-scale, bottom-up political processes that are intimately involved 
with the issues it addresses and the resources it manages. Th e aforementioned legal 
mechanism that enables the community to assert this level of self-determination 
is the CLT, which will be discussed in greater detail in the section to follow (5.3.1).
In this scenario, two adjacent strip malls will be acquired to form the basis for 
the Compton Commons development. This private property will be transferred 
to a CLT, and any subsequent development will occur within this community-
based property tenure model. The advantages of this strategy are multiple:
1. Prices for retail developments are generally calibrated to rental income. A 
shopping mall, if purchased with a down payment of 30 percent of its sale price, can 
generally cover its mortgage payments through its retail leases, at current sales levels.
2. Most retail leases are a base rent + percentage of sales.
3. Intensifying the use of a shopping mall creates low-cost land. If the parking lot 
can be re-designed to accommodate higher-value uses, the land that used to be a 
parking lot can be re-developed to higher-value uses for only the cost of creating 
parking structures to off set some of the parking spaces lost to development 
intensifi cation, as well as the site work to prepare the land for new buildings.
4. When the land of the development is held by a community trust, the 
increased revenue experienced by the existing retail establishments, due to 
the dramatic population increase, will result in a rental revenue increase 
(based on percentage of sales) that goes back to the community trust.
Th is framework could provide a model for development in which both capitalist 
ventures and community initiatives prosper. Th e existing tenants benefi t from an 
increased customer base and a portion of this increased revenue goes back into the 
community and is not siphoned off  into capital markets through profi ts and dividends.
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5.4.1. Community Land Trusts
Th e CLT model’s fl exibility and adaptability to local conditions make it an appealing 
solution to a range of problems aff ecting communities across the country including 
disinvestment, gentrifi cation and displacement, foreclosure, loss of aff ordability due 
to expiring public subsidy, housing discrimination, and decreasing social capital.190
A CLT is a not-for-profi t organization with membership open to any resident of the 
community in which it is located. Th e purpose of a CLT is to create a democratic 
and participatory institution to hold land and to retain the use-value of the land 
for the benefi t of the community, as opposed to land ownership for its exchange-
value. Th e  objective  of a CLT is to provide aff ordable access to land for housing 
and small businesses, as well as a wide variety of community-oriented uses, and 
to protect this land from future profi t-oriented development which may displace 
long-standing residents. Th e CLT is a locally-driven and sustainable model of 
aff ordable housing and community development that has grown steadily throughout 
the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom during the past 40 years.
A CLT acquires land by gift or purchase and then develops a land-use plan for the parcel, 
adopting an approach that fosters healthy ecosystems, an inclusive, appropriate social use 
of the land and a sustainable approach to development. Th e planning process incorporates 
input from residents of the community to ensure that the development addresses local needs.
5.5. Housing
Th e provision of aff ordable housing is another central tenet of Compton Commons. 
If the land upon which the housing is built is removed from the speculative forces 
of the market and held by the community in perpetuity, the appreciation of 
property value is not refl ected in the cost of housing. In Los Angeles, as well as in 
other major North American cities, this property value appreciation is dramatically 
outpacing income growth and driving rapidly increasing housing costs and 
rising levels of unaff ordability. (see Chapter 3)  A CLT framework restores the 
primacy of the use value of housing by de-emphasizing its exchange value and 
removing it from the volatile and corrupt forces of capital property markets.
In simplest terms, a CLT develops a parcel of land, retaining the ownership of the land 
190 Th e Architectural League’s Urban Omnibus Th e Culture of Citymaking, “Th e Value of Land: How Community 
Land Trusts Maintain Housing Aff ordability,” Accessed February 17, 2016, http://urbanomnibus.net/2014/04/the-val-
ue-of-land-how-community-land-trusts-maintain-housing-aff ordability/
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Fig. 5.15 community land trust (CLT)—schematic diagram
in perpetuity, and either sells or leases the individual units (houses, apartments, offi  ces, retail 
spaces, etc.) at a price based on the cost of construction of the unit and as well as a land lease that 
ensures there will be a stable reserve fund to cover ongoing maintenance costs. (see Figure 5.)
5.6. Independent Micro-enterprise
A Community Land Trust is proposed as the basis for establishing an equitable and inclusive 
foundation for community development that can provide aff ordable housing in markets 
where speculative property markets have infl ated the costs of housing far beyond any 
Community land trusts keep properties affordable by putting only the properties, not the land
they occupy, on the market.
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sustainable relationship to real income for ever-widening segments of society. A CLT can 
also serve as a framework that fosters independent local enterprise by aff ording fl exibility, 
a supportive community infrastructure and lower occupancy costs—crucial elements for 
small-scale fl edgling ventures that for-profi t real estate enterprises cannot off er. A CLT 
can off er inexpensive offi  ce and retail space in smaller units with more fl exible terms than 
is available in the free market. In addition to this, small-scale economic enterprises can 
be fostered by a supportive community in terms of peer networking, co-operative leasing 
and equipment-sharing arrangements, as well as a wide variety of community-based 
training, skills development, and educational initiatives. Th ere is a broad range of small-
scale enterprises, such as food trucks, micro-retail, and ‘makerspace’ facilities, which can 
be fostered by this community approach. A variety of these will be proposed as elements 
in a design masterplan in the next chapter, but the types and spatial disposition of 
these enterprises will be ultimately determined by, and evolve with, community needs.
Th e following chapter will present a design proposal based on this strategic 
platform with the ambition of crafting a locally-informed, personal response. While 
there is no pretence to universal applicability, this platform could also inform a wide 
range of community development initiatives that wish to incorporate ambitious 
water conservation strategies, aff ordable housing, and local economic self-suffi  ciency.
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6.0     COMPTON COMMONS—DESIGN PROPOSAL
Fig. 6.1 Compton Commons site
134
Fig. 6.2 existing site plan (1:10,000)
LEGEND
Compton Commons Site
Compton City Hall
1
2 3
4 5
6
7
8
1
Compton Public Library2
US Postal Service3
LA County Courthouse4
Compton Police Station5
Compton Blue Line Rail Station6
MLK Transit Centre7
Alameda Corridor cargo rail lines8
135
Fig. 6.3 existing site plan with hydrology (1:5,000)
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Fig. 6.4 storm water harvesting schematic with riverine fl ow path (1:10,000)
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Fig. 6.5 site plan—new buildings: ground level (1:2,500)
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Fig. 6.6 site plan—new buildings: roof level (1:2,500)
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Fig. 6.7 site plan with constructed wetlands (1:2,500)
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Fig. 6.8 stormwater and greywater treatment schematic (1:2,500)
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Fig. 6.9 greywater supply schematic (1:2,500)
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Fig. 6.10 site isometric
Fig. 6.11 program distribution isometric
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Fig. 6.12 detailed program distribution isometric—community use
Fig. 6.13 art gallery sculpture courtyard rendering
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Fig. 6.15 program distribution isometric—independent and micro-retail
Fig. 6.14 basketball court rendering
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Housing is a offered
through a Community Land
Trust, with owned units and
income-geared rental units in
a range of sizes from small studios
to 3-bedroom units.
Fig. 6.16 program distribution isometric—housing
Fig. 6.17 apartment courtyard rendering
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Fig. 6.18 apartment terrace overlooking constructed wetlands rendering
Fig. 6.19 main plaza rendering
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Fig. 6.20 terraced constructed wetlands rendering
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CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has investigated a range of contemporary crises—from water scarcity to spatial 
inequity—and the role neoliberal global capitalism has played in their production. Los Angeles 
has experienced these crises and felt many of their effects throughout its history. The current 
drought has called into question the availability of necessary water resources, and the evidence 
suggests that the city will have to deal with a substantial decline in the level of water supply in 
perpetuity. Demand, however, will continue to grow due to pressures from projected population 
growth, suggesting that water scarcity will be the ‘new normal’. Radical and comprehensive 
conservation strategies will be needed to maximize the productivity of diminishing water 
supplies to support sustainable growth. 
Transitioning from supply-side and demand-side approaches to a comprehensively 
sustainable water resource management paradigm is one example of the reparation of a 
metabolic rift generated by the top-down techno-scientific approach embedded within global 
capitalism. This is one of a vast array of environmental rifts that beset the world today. 
Additionally, the multitude of socio-economic rifts is an equally critical issue, but there has been 
an encouraging groundswell of protest, resistance and remedial action at all scales, from local to 
global. Uneven development is still a widespread and globally ubiquitous phenomenon, but the 
acceptance of the inevitability of this inequity and the unassailability of capitalism is diminishing. 
An array of discourses about the structural failures of capitalism and possible alternatives in a 
post-capitalist future has emerged. The right to the city, and a variety of community-based social 
justice initiatives related to this concept, are among the anti- and post-capitalist discourses 
pointing the way towards a more equitable and inclusive future. Resistance to the expansion of 
the territory of capitalism into all aspects of life and every corner of the biosphere is increasing, 
and the validity of property rights over fundamentals such as DNA is being called into question. 
This contestation of the absolute extension of private property rights is supported by an 
emerging alternative model of property rights, ‘the Commons’, as a third pillar of governance 
alongside capitalism and representative democracy. This governance philosophy posits that there 
are resources and territories over which there can be no justification for private, exclusive 
ownership, as they are ‘owned’ by all. While the grassroots resistance and critical discourse that 
have called capitalism into question are encouraging, the crises that are being addressed are 
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monumental. There is still a long way to go, but the inevitability and unassailability of capitalism 
can no longer be assumed. 
The design proposal outlined in this thesis, Compton Commons, has engaged in this 
discourse through the inclusion of core concepts such as affordability, inclusivity, sustainable 
resource stewardship, and grassroots economic development in a mixed-use development that is 
meant to provide a foundation for community-building. The design philosophy represents a shift 
from a ‘government’ paradigm to a ‘governance’ model. Here, the community is the locus of 
agency and power—not global corporations or big government. 
 Compton Commons is not intended to be a comprehensive solution to the crises and 
issues investigated in this thesis, but an example of a community-based initiative that addresses 
the local manifestations of these issues. At a conceptual level, one could support this proposal 
and envision the multiple benefits it would offer. However, the impediments to implementation 
are numerous and substantial. The design proposal is predicated on the acquisition of a site that 
would cost approximately twenty to thirty million dollars ($20,000,000-$30,000,000) in up-front 
capital without the involvement of investors that would expect a significant return or major 
government funding that would underwrite the entire project. The fundraising strategies 
initiatives that could realize this project would be the topic of another major research project. 
Additionally, realizing this project would require a number of major zoning adjustments and the 
co-operation of local government and community groups. It is also likely that there are other 
impediments that have not been considered. However, if this proposal, like the multitude of 
others that seek to address the critical issues humanity is facing, can be realized, an ambitious 
and relentless strategy must be adopted. To paraphrase philosopher Slavoj Žižek, we must 
‘demand the impossible’191, or pursue our necessary goals with the attitude outlined by John F. 
Kennedy in describing the mission to the moon: 
 
We choose to go to the moon, we choose to go to the moon in this decade and do the 
other things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard, because that goal will 
serve to organize and measure the best of our energies and skills, because that challenge is 
one that we are willing to accept, one we are unwilling to postpone, and one which we 
intend to win, and the others, too.192 
 
                                                            
191 Slavoj Žižek, Demanding the Impossible (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2013) 
192 Democratic Underground, John F. Kennedy, 
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=389x6431379 
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Addressing the vast array of global issues we face is a daunting task, but adopting the stance 
that the future is a work that we can author may empower necessary changes, regardless of the 
barriers and challenges in our path. 
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